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THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
RUSSELL F. PANNIERt
The nature of the judicial process and judicial discretion are issues that
traditionally have polarized legal philosophers. In this Article Professor
Pannier analyzes these issues through an examination of the theories ad-
vanced by the positivists and Ronald Dworkin. Professor Pannier raises
"objections to these theories and proposes a natural law theor of
adjudication.
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I. INTRODUCTION
H.L.A. Hart has argued that American jurisprudential thought
regarding the nature of the adjudicative process historically has
tended to polarize into two extremes, the "Nightmare" and the
"Noble Dream."' These two approaches differ primarily in their
treatments of the issue of judicial discretion.
In the Nightmare theory of adjudication, the judicial function is
understood as primarily legislative in nature. Judges do not dis-
cover preexisting rights or apply existing rules of law; rather, they
create rules and rights in the very process of adjudication. The
central feature of a mature legal system is the presence of judicial
discretion. No ascertainable constraints are imposed by a system
of preexisting rules that define rights and duties in a logically coer-
cive way.
2
In contrast, in the Noble Dream theory, courts resolve cases by
appealing to preexisting rights that are defined by preexisting
t Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. A.B., Olivet Col-
lege; M.A., Harvard University; J.D., University of Minnesota. The author would like to
thank Professor Michael K. Steenson and Professor David Haynes for reading an earlier-
version of this Article and making helpful suggestions.
1. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes.- The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
2. See id at 972-78.
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rules.3 Courts do not create law; they discover it. The central
feature of a legal system is the existence of a set of abstract rules
whose application, given the facts of a particular case, is a matter
of deductive logic. More precisely, a legal system is defined as a set
of rules with the following properties: a finite number of basic
rules, a consensus among competent participants in the legal order
as to the identity and content of the basic rules, consistency in the
sense that contradictions cannot be deductively derived from the
rules, completeness in the sense that the rules generate for any le-
gal question a determinate answer upon which competent partici-
pants will agree, and applicability by means of a decision
procedure that invariably terminates with a unique solution in a
finite number of steps and is rational in the sense that competent
participants agree as to how the procedure should be applied in
any particular instance.
4
Each extreme contains certain commonly-held assumptions
about the nature of adjudication. Perhaps it is our reluctance to
abandon any of these assumptions that accounts for our tendency
to vacillate between the competing theories of law. The
Nightmare theory incorporates at least the following assumptions:
that in some sense courts are a primary, and rules a secondary and
derivative, phenomenon; that the moral frameworks of individual
judges play an inevitable role in adjudication; and that no
mechanical decision procedure exists for rationally adjudicating
legal disputes. On the other hand, the Noble Dream is grounded
upon the assumptions that adjudication is ideally a principled pro-
cess, free of arbitrary discretion; that legal conclusions are ration-
ally objective, in that a consensus of informed participants ideally
is attainable; and that in some sense courts declare existing rights
and rules. A jurisprudence adequate to the phenomena would ar-
ticulate a theory incorporating the valid aspects of all of these
assumptions.
II. DWORKIN's THEORY OF ADJUDICATION
In his widely-discussed book, Taking Rights Ser'ously, 5 Ronald
Dworkin has attempted such a snythesis. I shall briefly set out the
3. See id. at 978.
4. I do not suggest that this kind of formulation can be found in any of the classical
proponents of this tradition. I propose it only as one way of explicating the conception.
For an elementary discussion of the concept of a finitary decision procedure, see S.
KLEENE, MATHEMATICAL LOGIC § 40 (1967).
5. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
[Vol. 7
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main outlines of his theory, state what I believe to be some of its
weaknesses, and contrast the theory with an analysis based upon a
natural law conception of legal reasoning. I shall argue that al-
though Dworkin's theory of adjudication incorporates many in-
sights and sheds much light on the legal process, a teleological
analysis provides a more adequate account.
Dworkin summarily rejects the Noble Dream theory of law,
which he refers to as "mechanical jurisprudence," arguing that it
cannot account either for evolutionary change in the common law
or for the fact that judicial decisions are often controversial within
the legal community. 6 For Dworkin, the opposite end of the juris-
prudential spectrum is occupied by positivism, which he takes to
have been definitively formulated and defended by H.L.A. Hart.
7
According to Dworkin, the theory of positivism holds that persons
have legal rights only insofar as enforceable rights have been cre-
ated either by "explicit political decisions or by explicit social
practices."8 More particularly, Dworkin believes that the positiv-
ist makes the following assumptions: 9 First, a legal system is a set
of special rules that a society uses to direct human conduct by
means of coercive public power. These rules are identifiable by
certain formal criteria articulable in a "rule Of recognition." The
criteria are formal in that they are not concerned with the content
of rules but with the manner in which rules are adopted by a soci-
ety. With a rule of recognition, a social order's legal rules can be
distinguished from those social rules that are not enforced with
coercive public power. Second, this class of valid legal rules ex-
hausts the system of law in the sense that if a particular case is not
clearly covered by one of the rules, then the dispute simply cannot
be resolved by "applying the law." Instead, it must be resolved by
an act of judicial discretion, that is, by a court's reaching beyond
the body of legal rules for an extra-legal standard or premise.
Third, one has a legal obligation if and only if one's situation falls
under some valid legal rule requiring one to do or to forbear from
doing something. In the absence of an applicable legal rule no
legal obligation exists. Thus, when a court resolves an issue by
exercising judicial discretion it is not enforcing any legal rights at
all.
6. See id at 16.
7. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
8. R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at xii.
9. Seeid at 17.
19811
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Dworkin argues that positivism entails claims about the nature
of adjudication that contradict the informed intuitions of lawyers.
For example, he believes positivism to be committed to the claim
that in a "hard case," that is, a case to which no settled rule ap-
plies, a court does not discover preexisting rights or duties, but cre-
ates rights and duties out of its own moral sense. In other words,
in hard cases courts engage in ex post facto legislation, rather than
in the enforcement of existing rights and duties. Dworkin thinks
that this implication conflicts with our legal intuitions and would
be justifiably regarded as morally outrageous by the losing parties
in hard cases. 10
Dworkin's central argument against positivism rests upon a dis-
tinction between legal rules and principles.11 According to Dwor-
kin, in hard cases courts use standards that function as principles
rather than rules. 12 He cites the proposition that no one shall be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong as an example of a
legal principle;13 the proposition- that a will is -invalid unless signed
by three witnesses is an example of a legal rule.
14
Rules are distinguishable from principles in two respects. The
first distinction concerns the differing ways in which rules apply.
Rules apply in an all-or-nothing fashion.15 If the facts that condi-
tion a rule exist, then either the rule applies, in which case the
solution dictated by the rule must be accepted, or it does not, in
which case the rule bears no relevance to the resolution of the case.
A rule may have exceptions, but if it does, a full statement of the
rule will list all of them. 16
Principles operate differently. One can truthfully say that our
legal system incorporates the principle that no one may profit from
his or her own wrong without having to insist that the system
never permits such profiting.' 7 Dworkin argues that we do not
take an instance such as this as proving that principles are quali-
fied by exceptions, but rather that we do not treat such counter-
instances as constituting exceptions at all. 18 The instances in
10. See id
11. See id at 22-28.
12. ee id
13. Id at 23.
14. Id at 24.
15. Id
16. Id at 24-25.
17. Id at 25.
18. See id at 25-26.
[Vol. 7
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which the legal system refuses to apply any given legal principle
are not subject to enumeration as exceptions to rules are. A princi-
ple does not purport to state conditions that make its application
necessary; instead, it states a reason that argues in a certain direc-
tion. 19 A principle is never conclusive by itself. In hard cases com-
peting principles are always present.20 One principle may prevail
over a second in one case, but yield to it in another. All that is
meant by the statement that a given principle is included within
the legal system is that courts must at least take that principle into
account, if it is relevant, as a reason for inclining in one direction
or another.
2'
A second difference is that unlike rules, principles have weight.
22
When two principles conflict, a court must resolve the conflict by
measuring each rule's relative weight or importance.2 3 The weight
that a principle carries in a particular legal context is always sig-
nificant,2 4 but to ask the same question about rules does not make
sense.25 Rules do not have weight; if two rules conflict, one must
be invalid. And the judicial decision as to which rule is valid must
be reached on grounds transcending the rules themselves.
26
In the resolution of a hard case a court must necessarily rely
upon principles rather than rules. 27 The resolution reached by the
court in such a case will determine a rule for which the case can
later be cited. But the rule will not preexist the case. The rule is
fashioned by the judge on the basis of legal principles.28
Dworkin contrasts two ways of understanding the role of princi-
ples. On one hand, they could be regarded as binding upon the
courts in the same way as rules;29 that is to say, the law contains
certain principles that courts must at least consider in resolving
hard cases. On the other hand, one might deny that principles are
legally binding and maintain instead that in hard cases courts
reach beyond standard legal principles.30 Dworkin subscribes to





24. Id at 27.
25. See id
26. &e id
27. See id at 28.
28. See id
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the first notion. His basic argument is that one can describe courts
as enforcing preexisting rights in hard cases only if the principles
upon which courts rely in resolving hard cases are principles that
the legal system compels them to consider.
3'
Courts do not have discretion in the positivists' sense. To say
that someone has discretion with respect to the resolution of an
issue is to say that he is not bound by standards imposed by the
relevant authority. 32 But courts never reach beyond standards im-
posed by the legal system. The principles relied upon by courts in
the resolution of hard cases are themselves part of the law, and
courts are legally obligated to take them into account.
33
It also follows that there can be no rule of recognition of the
kind postulated by the positivists. 34 No master criterion exists for
segregating all and only all of those rules of the social order that
are "legal." It is the presence of principles in the legal system that
makes the formulation of any such master rule impossible. 35 Legal
principles do not arise from decisions of courts or enactments of
legislatures. Instead, their origin lies in a "sense of appropriate-
ness" that develops within the legal profession and the public over
time. 36 Furthermore, one could never list all of the legal princi-
ples; they are literally countless. 37 Finally, even their identity is
indeterminate and controversial; 38 it is inevitable that competent
judges and lawyers will differ over whether any given proposition
is a legal principle at all.
The positivist theory of legal obligation also must be rejected.
39
That theory holds that a legal duty exists if and only if an estab-
lished rule of law imposes such a dutyY° Hence, in a hard case no
legal duty arises until the court creates a new rule and applies it to
the parties in the suit ex post facto.41 Once one abandons the posi-
tivist doctrine of judicial discretion, one sees that legal duties are
posited by constellations of principles as well as by established
31. See id at 29-30.
32. Id at 32.
33. Ste id at 34-38.
34. St id at 39-44.
35. See id at 40.
36. Id
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rules.42 A legal obligation exists when the binding legal principles
supporting such an obligation are weightier than the principles ar-
guing against it.
4 3
Dworkin concedes that a consensus on how any particular hard
case is to be resolved will rarely occur.44 For one thing, room al-
ways exists for reasonable debate over the identify of the relevant
principles. 45 Additionally, even if everyone agreed on a set of rele-
vant principles in a particular case, there would never be agree-
ment over the weights to be assigned each principle in that
context.
46
If no master rule of recognition is present, logically no ultimate
distinction can be drawn between legal principles and standards
on the one hand, and moral and political principles and standards
on the other.47 This means that the principles and standards un-
derlying any particular judge's resolution of a hard case will in-
clude moral standards.48 But if this is so, how can Dworkin
maintain that judges have no discretion? Is it not clear that al-
lowing courts to appeal to moral and political principles is giving
them discretion in the positivists' sense?
Dworkin's response relies upon the concept of institutional sup-
port. Only those principles and standards that have institutional
support in the form of a "sense of appropriateness developed in the
profession and the public over time" are eligible for use in the jus-
tification of judicial determination.49 Presumably it is the pres-
ence of institutional support that prevents the adjudication of
cases from degenerating into a decision based upon the individual
moral discretion of particular judges.
To understand fully this concept of institutional support, one
must consider the method of decisionmaking that Dworkin be-
lieves his theory to entail. He asks us to imagine each judge (and
ultimately each lawyer participating in the legal order on behalf of
clients) articulating a "theory of law" for resolving cases.50 Such a
theory would be constructed as follows: One would enumerate all
42. See id
43. See id
44. Set id at 126.
45. See id at 44.
46. See id at 40.
47. See id at 46.
48. See id at 68.
49. Id at 40.
50. See id at 66.
1981]
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of the legal rules that are "plainly valid rules of law" in the rele-
vant jurisdiction. 51 One would then add to them all of the "ex-
plicit rules" about "institutional competence" used in selecting the
first set of rules. 52 One would then take those two sets of rules and
look for the complex of principles necessary to justify them.5 3 This
search for a comprehensive justification ideally would result in a
set of principles with weights assigned to each.
54
It must not be inferred from this that a theory of law could con-
stitute a rule of recognition in the positivists' sense. For that to be
the case a theory of law would have to constitute a "social rule,"
that is, a pattern of conduct shared by all informed participants in
the legal order.55 A social rule of recognition would consist of a set
of practices, shared by all judges, determining the limits of the
class of appropriate principles and standards.56 No such social rule
of recognition exists. 5 7 On the other hand, Dworkin does argue
that a theory of law constitutes a "normative rule" of recogni-
tion. 58 A normative rule of recognition is a set of principles put
forward as the morally acceptable standards for courts to use in
resolving cases. 59 Any particular judge will have, at least implic-
itly, a normative rule of recognition in the form of a theory of law
allegedly providing the most adequate moral justification for the
body of explicit legal rules, but the theories will vary among
themselves. 6°
The concept of institutional support is tied to the distinction be-
tween "background rights" and "institutional rights." Back-
ground rights are moral rights as defined by some particular moral
theory, which, in turn, are necessarily held by some particular in-
dividual. They are rights that provide justifications for "political
decisions by society in the abstract. '61 That is, they are rights on
whose basis the legally enforceable rights of a society can be evalu-
ated. On the other hand, institutional rights are rights "that pro-
51. Id
52. Id Such rules would presumably include constitutional and statutory rules con-
cerning the jurisdiction of courts and legislatures.
53. See id
54. See id
55. See id at 50-51.
56. Id at 59-60.
57. Id at 60.
58. See id at 67.
59. See id at 60.
60. See id. at 67.
61. Id at 93.
[Vol. 7
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vide a justification for a decision by some particular and specified
political institution. '62 Associated with this distinction is a distinc-
tion between background and institutional morality. One may be-
lieve as part of one's background morality that every person has a
right to the property of another if the first has greater needs. And
yet one may at the same time admit that there is no such legisla-
tive or judicial right, that is, that no such right is part of the rele-
vant institutional morality.
63
Background rights and background morality are matters of
what Dworkin calls "individual morality," which is the set of per-
sonal moral beliefs and values held by an individual. 64 In contrast,
institutional rights and morality arise from the "community mo-
rality," which consists of the shared moral beliefs and values of an
entire society. 65 Institutional rights are rights defined by the com-
munity's institutional morality.
66
In hard cases courts must rely upon institutional rights and mo-
rality rather than background rights and morality.6 7 It is this limi-
tation that prevents adjudication from sliding into the subjectivity
of personal moral discretion.
Dworkin illustrates this thesis by outlining a method for consti-
tutional adjudication. 68 Imagine that a court must pass on the
constitutionality of a statute providing for free busing to children
in parochial schools. Suppose that the constitution includes a pro-
hibition against the establishment of religion. Dworkin suggests
that the court might begin by articulating a philosophical theory
that explains why any constitution has power to create or destroy
rights. Assuming the availability of such a comprehensive justifi-
cation, the court must go on to seek the scheme of constitutional
principles determined by the constitution. That is, the court must
construct a "constitutional theory." Such a theory will be a set of
principles adequate to justify the constitution as a whole. The the-
ory must "fit" the particular rules of the constitution; for example,
the theory cannot include a "background right" to an established
religion. But in general, more than one available theory will fit
the clause prohibiting an establishment of religion. One such the-
62. Id
63. See id
64. Se id at 126.
65. See id
66. See id
67. See id at 101.
68. Id at 106-07.
1981]
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ory might hold that government should not enact legislation likely
to cause social tension, which presumably would be caused by an
establishment of religion. Another theory might hold that all citi-
zens have background rights to religious liberty, which presuma-
bly would be violated by an establishment of religion. The court
will have to choose between such alternative theories. This choice
will be made in part by looking to see which alternative coheres
more closely with the entire constitutional scheme, that is, with the
other constitutional rules and the "settled practices" under those
rules. But even assuming that this test marks one of the alternative
theories as superior, the theory chosen may not be sufficiently con-
crete to decide the particular issue before the court. Suppose, for
example, that the court chooses the theory that relies upon the
concept of religious liberty. Whether the statute before the court
violates that liberty may still be an open question. To resolve this
ambiguity, the court must explicate the concept of religious liberty
itself. Assuming that the institutional morality that underlies the
constitutional prohibition of an establishment of religion concerns
the protection of religious liberty, the question may remain
whether such liberty would be threatened by this statute. Resolu-
tion of this question would require the court to choose between
alternative explications of the concept of religious liberty. The
standard for making this choice would require the court to ascer-
tain which explication best fits the total complex of constitutional
rules and practices.
But again, checking for this kind of consistency between theory
and institutional framework might not be sufficient. If it is not,
the court must engage in political philosophy by deciding which
alternative is a better explication of the concept of religious lib-
erty. Even when the court is undertaking political philosophy,
however, it is still trying to articulate the underlying moral frame-
work of the institution rather than its own individual moral
sense.
69
In response to the objection that this account portrays courts as
relying upon their own moral convictions in resolving cases, Dwor-
kin distinguishes two ways in which a judge might rely upon his
own moral opinions. On the one hand, he might appeal to his own
individual sense of rightness as ultimate arbiter.70 On the other
hand, he might appeal to his own moral convictions simply as a
69. See id at 126.
70. See id at 124.
[Vol. 7
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means of ascertaining the nature of the institutional principles he
is trying to explicate. He might proceed on the assumption that
his own moral beliefs accurately mirror the moral beliefs of the
community, and refer to the former as a matter of convenience. If
one's own moral sense is a mirror image of society's moral sense,
then all one need to determine the nature of the latter is to look
within. 71 Dworkin maintains that his theory does not allow a
court to choose between its own moral convictions and those it
takes to be the moral convictions of the "community at large.
'72
Rather, the theory requires a court to single out "a particular con-
ception of community morality as decisive of legal issues."' 13 The
morality that provides the basis for a court's theory of law is the
community morality "presupposed by the laws and institutions of
the community. ' 74 Courts are compelled to rely upon their own
sense of what the community morality is, but this kind of reliance
is not the kind that would result in subjectivism or positivistic
moral discretion. 75 Even when a court shares the values of the
community morality, it relies upon its own moral sense as a guide
or means of access to the essence of the institutional morality. 76 In
such a case the "sharp distinction between background and insti-
tutional morality will fade, not because institutional morality is
displaced by personal convictions, but because personal convic-
tions have become the most reliable guide he. has to institutional
morality.
'77
Again, Dworkin concedes that courts will often reach different
conclusions as to the nature of the community morality. 78 But the
debate triggered by judicial resolutions of hard cases is not a mat-
ter of individuals pitting their personal moral convictions against
those of others, 79 such debate consists rather of individuals arguing
over alternative explications of a socially shared concept or
71. Seeid at 124-26.
72. See id at 126.
73. Id
74. Id Notice that with the use of the word "presuppose" Dworkin apparently is
committed to the proposition that when it comes to the relationship between moral princi-
ples and the laws of a particular community, there is only one possible set of moral princi-
ples that could be used to justify those laws. That is, Dworkin is committed to denying the
possibility of there being more than one set of "community principles" that could provide
justification for a particular set of institutions and laws.
75. See id
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principle.80
Community morality does not consist of the sum of individual
moralities held by the members of the community; it is a unitary
phenomenon, a single complex of principles. 8' The presence of
conflicting claims about the nature of the principles does not com-
mit one to denying the existence of a single focus for those claims,
just as the presence of conflicting claims as to, say, the nature of a
bright light shining in the night sky does not entail the conclusion
that there is no single phenomenon to be described or explained.
In summary, Dworkin believes that even in a hard case for
which no settled legal rule exists that disposes of the issue, one of
the parties nevertheless has a preexisting right to win.8 2 Courts in
hard cases are obligated to discover rights and duties; they are not
entitled to create new rights retrospectively.8 3 Any legal question
has a single right answer.8 4 But no mechanical decisionmaking
procedure is available for determining the rights of parties in hard
cases.8 5 Reasonable lawyers-and judges often will differ over legal
rights.8
6
How should one go about evaluating Dworkin's theory of adju-
dication? One point to be stressed is the theory's phenomenologi-
cal depth. It is perhaps too easy for those engaged in
jurisprudence to forget the lessons that should have been learned
from Husserl. 7 An important preliminary to theorizing about the
nature of the legal process is to pay close attention to the legal
phenomena themselves. Only to the extent that one succeeds in
seeing these phenomena is one in a position to theorize in a useful
way. Dworkin's analysis of the adjudicative process sets new stan-
dards for this kind of descriptive effort. His careful analyses consti-
tute an important class of the phenomena that any adequate
theory must illuminate.8 8
The book is equally significant for its theoretical comprehensive-
ness. It reminds us that phenomenological description, although
80. See id.
81. See id. at 128-29.
82. Id at 81.
83. See id
84. Id at 279.
85. See id at 81.
86. Id
87. See E. HUSSERL, IDEAS (W. Gibson trans. 1931).
88. Considerations of space prevent me from incorporating his detailed analysis of
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important, is not of much use if pursued for its own sake. Dworkin
proposes his theory as a major alternative to the positivistic and
realistic theories that have prevailed in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence in recent times; as such, it deserves careful attention.
Perhaps the central question is whether Dworkin's effort suc-
ceeds in avoiding attributing to courts discretion in the positivistic
sense. According to Dworkin, to attribute discretion to a judge in
the positivists' sense is to say that the judge is not bound by stan-
dards imposed by the relevant authority, 89 presumably the body of
law of the relevant jurisdiction. 90 Does a Dworkinian judge have
discretion in this sense?
Here the analysis becomes obscure. Dworkin's basic argument
is that judges have no discretion because they are bound by princi-
ples of community and institutional morality that are themselves
part of the law. But this would be unlikely to persuade a positivist.
A positivist presumably would be unwilling to regard such princi-
ples as part of the law in his sense of "law." If Dworkin is right
about the definition of positivism, then a positivist is committed to
belief in a master rule of recognition formulable as a social rule.
Dworkin denies the existence of such a social rule and concedes
that principles in his sense cannot be selected by any such crite-
rion. But it must follow that a positivist would not deem anything
to be part of the law that is not determinable by such a criterion.
Hence, the positivist would be unwilling to concede that
Dworkinian judges lack discretion in hard cases because they are
not bound by rules or principles ascertainable by a social rule of
recognition, which therefore are not rules or principles of law at
all.
The objection might be raised that this shows only that the ulti-
mate dispute between Dworkin and the positivist is over the exist-
ence of a social rule of recognition. In a sense, this is correct;
however, the point is that even if the positivist were persuaded to
reject the possibility of a rule of recognition, he would presumably
still be unwilling to accept Dworkin's claim that courts lack discre-
tion. The positivist might simply say: "I was mistaken about the
rule of recognition. There is none. But that proves even more
clearly that judges do have discretion. If they are not bound by a
social rule of recognition upon which all informed participants can
agree, then they are bound by nothing except their own personal
89. See id at 32.
90. See id at 34.
1981]
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moral and political beliefs, and if that is not discretion, nothing
is."
Thus, one of the deepest differences between Dworkin and the
positivist appears to be the distinction between truth and ver-
ifiability. Dworkin rejects what he takes to be the positivist ten-
dency to identify truth with public verifiability.9' But even if the
positivist were to agree that in some ultimate sense truth and ver-
ifiability are distinct, I believe he would still maintain that if
courts in hard cases are not bound by publicly shared, intersubjec-
tively applicable methods of the kind provided by a social rule of
recognition, then they do have discretion in an important sense.
The positivist might understandably believe that the sense in
which courts are bound by law in Dworkin's theory is a very weak
one. Apparently, principles bind courts only in the sense that
courts, in resolving hard cases, are obligated at least to consider
the possible relevancy of the principles. There is no predetermined
set of principles and no consensus as to the weights to be assigned
them in any particular legal context.
This reluctance to be impressed by Dworkin's concept of being
bound by law is one likely shared by those on the opposite end of
the jurisprudential spectrum-those attracted by some version of
the Noble Dream. I suspect that one who is disturbed by the
thought that judges have discretion in the positivistic sense is not
likely to feel much better at the prospect of judges being bound by
the law in Dworkin's sense. One concerned about the threat of
indeterminacy of adjudicative result is not likely to be calmed by
an appeal to principles that are moral and political in nature,
whose identity is controversial, and that carry a dimension of
weight that varies from context to context and from person to
person.
This leads to Dworkin's claim that preexisting legal rights exist
and that legal issues have uniquely correct solutions. Because he
rejects the possibility of a social rule of recognition, he cannot
maintain thit rights and obligations flow from the law as defined
by positivism. In fact, as we have seen, he argues that no ultimate
distinction at all can be drawn between legal and moral principles.
The key lies in his concept of an institutional morality. The body
of principles by which judges are bound is embedded within the
community morality. The preexisting rights that courts discover
91. See id at 279-90.
[Vol. 7
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss3/1
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION
are institutional rights defined by the institutional morality of the
social order in which the courts participate. The uniquely correct
solution to a legal question is unique not because it follows from
objectively true moral principles, but because it follows from the
relevant institutional morality. Thus, it appears that Dworkin is
ultimately a conventionalist with respect to moral truth, at least
insofar as moral truth is brought to bear upon the adjudicative
process. 92 Legal reasoning is a mode of moral reasoning, but moral
reasoning, as applied in the adjudicative context, is a matter of
inferring conclusions from the community's shared morality.
One of the questions that should be asked is whether a commu-
nity morality exists in the sense required by this theory. Here one
must appeal to one's phenomenological sense of things. In some
sense, participants in a social order seem to share moral norms and
practices. The question, however, is whether the kind of pattern
sharing that exists in a complex society is sufficiently monolithic or
determinate to accomplish the epistemological task Dworkin has
set out to complete. I think that this is doubtful. The better ac-
count would appear to be one that understands moralities as pri-
marily individual, rather than social, phenomena, and that the
sense in which socially shared moralities exist is different from, and
far weaker than, the sense in which moral orientations are ex-
pressed by the actions and practices of individuals. As I shall try
to explain more fully later, a socially shared norm or practice is
necessarily less than fully concrete, and hence is necessarily inde-
terminate. A socially shared practice or pattern can be made con-
crete in the world only through instantiation by specific acts of
persons. Each such act presupposes a specific interpretation of the
abstract pattern. These sepecific interpretations inevitably tend to
differ among themselves. Hence, the instantiation by individuals
of socially shared patterns makes impossible any monolithic or
unitary community morality. There is unity, if at all, only on the
abstract level of the patterns as such. When the patterns are ap-
plied in history through concrete acts of interpretation, there is
disunity and variation.
I suggest that Dworkin's underlying picture of the moral reason-
ing done by courts tends to mislead. That picture consists of a
unitary, monolithic structure at which individual judges look from
92. Strictly speaking, perhaps the most that can be legitimately inferred from Dwor-
kin's text is that moral conventionalism is the proper pose for judges acting in their official
capacities as judges, not that individual morality is ultimately a matter of convention.
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their varying perspectives. On one hand, we have a single unitary
phenomenon, the community morality. On the other hand, we
have the individual perspectives that, although likely to vary
among themselves, are nevertheless focused upon the same thing,
the common institutional morality. The implicit appeal is to the
kind of relationship existing between a physical object (e.g., the
moon), and the different physical perspectives of individuals look-
ing at the object in an effort to ascertain its nature (e.g., individual
astronomers peering at the moon through their individual
telescopes). This picture is misleading in that if there is no such
unitary phenomenon, reliance upon the metaphor can only distort
thinking about the nature of adjudication.
If this criticism is valid and if judges use moral reasoning in
hard cases, as Dworkin convinces me that they do, then the chal-
lenge is to articulate an account of legal reasoning that does justice
to the fact that courts do use moral reasoning but that does not
appeal to a mythical notion of institutional morality.
In addition, Dworkin's assumption of the significance of ranking
judicial decisions according to their degree of rationality and
moral justifiability seems to mirror an intuition shared by many
lawyers. We seem to sense that legal reasoning, at least ideally, is
objective and rational and that it in some way makes sense to dis-
cuss legal rights in terms of objective truth and validity. But if
Dworkin's notion of a community morality is a myth, then the task
is one of articulating a different basis for this intuition.
An adequate account should also incorporate, and account for,
Dworkin's thesis that a socially shared practice is essentially inde-
terminate in application, that is, that the application of such a
pattern in particular instances is generally a matter of controversy.
Even if Dworkin's belief in a single community morality is mis-
guided, his intuition of the unavoidable presence of indeterminacy
in the application of socially shared norms is one that should not
be ignored.
Finally, Dworkin's account of the role of principles in legal rea-
soning should be incorporated in any adequate jurisprudence. His
insight is that principles function as reasons that influence a court
in deciding one way or another, rather than as rules applicable in
an all-or-nothing fashion. The difficulty with his account, how-
ever, is that his concept of weight does not shed much light on the
ways in which such reasons are used in legal justification. An ade-
quate account of legal reasoning would explain the role of reasons
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in a way that would not appeal to the metaphor of balancing
weights. This image is ineffective, both because it suggests the
availability of a decision method that we really do not have, the
method of "weighing" the reasons, and because it does not instruct
us how courts do or should use reasons in reaching conclusions.
In summary, an adequate theory of adjudication should incor-
porate at least the following features. It should allow for, and ex-
plain, our intuition that in some sense legal reasoning is potentially
objective and rational, and that one can distinguish between de-
grees of validity and justifiability of legal conclusions. At the same
tim , the account should incorporate the positivists' insight that
adjudication is inherently morally creative and that in an impor-
tant way judges do have discretion. It should account for the role
of moral reasoning in adjudication, but in a way that does not
posit a unitary institutional morality or a moral conventionalism.
It should explain the way in which adjudication does apply so-
cially shared norms and practices, but in a way that allows for the
essential indeterminacy of those patterns. Finally, the account
should explain the role of reasons in adjudication in a way that
discloses the manner in which they actually work and that suggests
methods for improving that working.
III. A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF ADJUDICATION
I suggest that all of these features can be provided by a natural
law theory of adjudication. Such an analysis, based upon concepts
formulated by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Heidegger,93 portrays
a legal system as a teleological structure whose primary function is
the serving of human purposes. Legal reasoning is understood as a
mode of reflective thinking concerned with teleological arguments,
which are those arguments that assess the adequacy of means to
produce ends and the desirability of the ends.
Adjudication is a form of practical reasoning in which the adju-
dicator chooses between alternative solutions of a case on the basis
of teleological considerations pertaining to moral objectives that
are in some sense shared. A judicial decision is an act, and, like
93. I do not claim that the details of the following analysis can be found in the works
of Plato, Aristotle, or Aquinas, but I do think that their work readily suggests that kind of
approach. Furthermore, although Heidegger did not consider himself a natural law phi-
losopher, I believe that many of his insights can be accomodated easily within a natural
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any act, can be teleologically evaluated in terms of moral pur-
poses. Thus, legal reasoning is a form of moral reasoning and the
latter is itself a form of teleological reasoning. Hence, to the extent
that teleological reasoning is objective, or capable of being so, legal
reasoning is objective as well. And because the natural law theo-
rist thinks that moral reasoning is objective, he is committed to
attributing a similar type of objectivity to legal reasoning.
9 4
Reasoning is a mode of reflection in which conclusions are
drawn on the basis of other beliefs relied upon as premises; it is the
process of drawing inferences. The product of reasoning is the ar-
gument, a set of propositions consisting of premises, conclusion,
and inference steps. Arguments can be classified as either deduc-
tive or inductive. A deductive argument is one whose user pur-
ports to establish a logically necessary connection between
premises and conclusion; that is, a deductive argument purports to
show that it would be logically inconsistent to accept the premises
while denying the conclusion. On the other hand, -an -inductive
argument purports only to establish a greater or lesser degree of
probability connecting premises and conclusion; the most one can
conclude from a successful inductive argument is that if the prem-
ises are true, then the conclusion is probably true as well. 95 I shall
argue that, when fully analyzed, legal arguments are inductive.
By an "objective" mode of reasoning, I mean a mode of infer-
ence in which the standards for evaluating arguments cast in that
mode are sufficiently shared and understood by participants to al-
low for the possibility of informed consensus as to the validity of
particular arguments. I believe that legal reasoning is capable of
objectivity in this sense. I do not mean to suggest that legal rea-
soning is capable of a degree of objectivity that would exclude the
possibility of good-faith dispute. And I certainly do not mean to
suggest that legal reasoning is reducible to a finitary decision pro-
cedure. But the unavoidability of strict mathematical objectivity
does not mean that legal argument must be consigned to the realm
of the irrational. If moral reasoning does not carry the potentiality
for mathematical objectivity, one should not despair of its ration-
ality but should rather try to understand the kind of rationality
that it does have.
94. For an illuminating, general account of the natural law framework, see Mclnery,
The Prtinciples fNatural Law, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1980).
95. For an account of these elementary concepts, see S. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF
LOGIc 1-12 (3d ed. 1980).
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Both the possibility and necessity of moral reasoning follow
from the fact that we are temporal beings with a measure of free-
dom concerning the uses to which our time is put. That is, a per-
son is a mode of time with some capacity to shape and direct the
uses of that time. I shall refer to this mode of time as "personal
time."
Given the concept of personal time, one can explicate the con-
cept of a human action. To act is to use personal time in one way
rather than other ways. It follows from this usage that a person
acts in every conscious moment, since there is always some answer
to the question "What am I doing now, as opposed to all the other
things which I could be, but am not, doing?" This is not to deny
the role of necessity; factors are inherent in every concrete set of
circumstances beyond the control of the individual. Nevertheless,
as the Stoics argued,9 room always exists for alternative attitudes
to those factors in one's experience that cannot be altered.
Human action is teleological, that is, it is goal-directed. It is a
matter of using personal time in an intentional way, a matter of
acting to achieve objectives. To act is to act with an intention.
This is not to discount the existence of unconscious purposes. Un-
conscious intentions guide conduct just as efficiently as their con-
scious counterparts. The point is that such purposes, although
unconscious, are nevertheless intentions. Purposive conduct may
be conscious or unconscious, in varying degrees. But it is always
teleological.
Purposes arise from needs and desires. One acts to achieve pur-
poses and one has purposes only because one has needs and desires.
This is not to suggest that purposes constitute one class of psycho-
logical phenomena and needs another. In a trivial sense one
desires whatever one pursues as an objective. The distinction in-
stead relates to two different dimensions of intentional conduct:
the objective state of affairs one seeks to bring about, on the one
hand, and the felt want or desire, on the other.
The concepts of desire and action lead to the concept of emotion
or state of awareness, or state of mind in Heidegger's sense.97 A
state of awareness is one's experience of oneself in response to the
relationship between the world as experienced and one's desires.
Within the general category of states of awareness one can distin-
96. See Epictetus, Discourses, in THE STOIC AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 275-80
(W. Oates ed. 1940).
97. See M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 93, § 29.
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guish states of well-being from states of suffering. One suffers to
the extent that a desire is unfulfilled; one experiences well-being to
the extent that a desire is fulfilled.
The natural law tradition posits the existence of a human es-
sence-a deep set of needs and desires, common to all persons,
whose fulfillment tends to bring about whatever measure of well-
being is attainable in the human condition. Frustration of that
essence causes suffering. These essential desires strive to realize
themselves in modes of activity. To the extent that one acts in
ways tending to fulfill the essential desires one has well-being. To
the extent one fails in this effort one suffers. Action directed to the
fulfillment of the essential needs constitutes the meaning of human
existence.
The human good is definable as the integrated fulfillment of the
essential needs and desires.98 This is an intrinsic good in the sense
that its pursuit requires no justification in terms of serving as a
means toward the achievement of any other ends. Instrumental
goods are those that serve as conditions either necessary or useful
for the attainment of intrinsic good.
A natural law theory of the right is a teleological, as opposed to
deontological, theory,9 that is, the concept of the right is definable
in terms of the good. Actions are prima facie right or morally jus-
tifiable insofar as they tend to promote intrinsic good. This crite-
rion of the right applies not only to discrete actions but to norms
and practices as well. Thus, the standard for the moral justifiabil-
ity of social patterns, including legal norms, looks to the degree to
which those patterns tend to promote, or frustrate, the achieve-
ment of intrinsic good.
The natural law theory of intrinsic good does not deny the exist-
ence of conflicting desires. It is commonplace that the complex of
desires within any individual is such that fulfillment of some
causes frustration of others. It follows that even a life in which the
essential desires are fulfilled, to the extent possible in the human
condition, inevitably includes a measure of suffering resulting from
frustration of desires that conflict with the essential needs. How-
98. For an interesting recent formulation of a natural law theory of intrinsic good, see
D. WALHOUT, THE GOOD AND THE REALM OF VALUES (1978).
99. A deontological theory, in the standard usage, is one that denies that the right is
wholly a function of the good. That is, it maintains that there are other considerations
that make an action right besides the good results brought about by the act. For general
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ever, the tradition also insists that the kind of suffering brought
about in this way is not as deep as that caused by frustration of the
essential needs. One whose essential needs are fulfilled is inte-
grated in a sense in which one whose essential needs are unmet
cannot be; integration is a state in which the kind of frustration
that results from conflict of basic desires is minimized.1
00
The concepts of a moral question and moral reflection can now
be explicated. A moral question arises for any given use of per-
sonal time, that is, for any human action or pattern of conduct.
This is so because given any particular way of using human time
there are always alternative uses of time that have been excluded
by the former use. Hence, the paradigmatic question of morality,
"Why do this rather than that?" can be asked with respect to every
use of human time. And this question, in turn, calls for a moral
justification of the action chosen. Moral reflection is reflection
about the potential uses of one's time and the available justifica-
tions for those alternative uses. More particularly, it is reflection
about the nature of intrinsic human good and about the condi-
tions necessary or useful for the attainment of intrinsic good. To
determine the sense, if any, in which moral reflection is potentially
rational one must examine the process of moral reflection more
closely.
It is useful to begin with an analysis of the process of reflecting
upon the motivations leading an individual to take a particular
course of action. This process can be understood as issuing in a
form of practical argument in the Aristotelian sense. Imagine,
first, trying to account for an action of one's own. One might be-
gin with stating one's immediate objective. Having tentatively as-
certained this, one might go on to ask whether pursuit of that
objective in turn was taken as a means toward achieving some fur-
ther end. In this manner one eventually will specify a series of
objectives or ends, each of which was pursued as a means toward
the ends specified later in the sequence. (One possible schematic
form of such an analysis is the following: in doing X my immedi-
ate objective was Y. I sought Y as a means to Z. I sought Z as a
means to Z, and the latter as a means to Z2, etc.). I shall refer to
the result of such an analysis as an "explanatory practical argu-
100. For helpful discussions of this sense of integration, see F. BRADLEY, Why Should I
Be Moral?, in ETHICAL STUDIES 58-82 (2d ed. 1927); A. MAsLow, TOWARD A PSYCHOL-
OGY OF BEING ch. 10 (2d ed. 1968); R. MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF (1953).
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ment," 101 which means a teleological form of reasoning about
means and ends with respect to use of personal time, purporting to
account for the action taken by reference to the underlying moti-
vations and intentions.
0 2
Such an argument can be schematized in a more formal
manner:
1) I desire A for itself and not as a means to anything else.
2) I believe that doing B is either a necessary or useful means
of achieving A.
n) I believe that doing N is either a necessary or useful means
of attaining N-1.
Therefore: I choose to do N.
This concept of an explanatory practical argument can be re-
lated to the concept of a reason for acting. The entire teleological
structure of an action articulated by the appropriate practical ar-
gument constitutes one's reason for making that choice. That is,
one's reason for making a particular choice consists of the total
means-end sequence that one was pursuing at the moment of the
act.
Without completing a teleological analysis one does not fully
understand one's action at all and hence would be unable even to
characterize it adequately. One has not fully characterized an ac-
tion or pattern of conduct until one has described the ultimate
purpose or project constituting the final term in the sequence of
ends. Some qualifications should be made, however. First, I do
not mean to imply that the process of explaining one's conduct in
teleological terms is easy. On the contrary, the process is often
difficult, sometimes requiring the assistance of experts' therapeutic
guidance. Second, ends brought forth in such analyses are often
101. The term "explanatory practical argument" may seem self-contradictory since
explanations are commonly distinguished from justifications. I use this phrase to convey
the idea that the teleological structure of a human action constitutes both an explanation
of the conduct and the chain of reasoning that, in fact, persuaded the agent to act in that
manner.
102. Of course, this schematic form is a drastic oversimplification of the motivational
structure of the typical act. For one thing, the form misleadingly suggests that the se-
quence of objectives is always linear. In fact, in most cases there will be branchings of
means and ends. That is, many of the specific objectives in such an explanatory analysis
will in turn be chosen as tending to promote more than one further end. But at the same
time, if the natural law tradition is correct in believing that all human action is ultimately
explicable as aiming at a single overarching end, the branchings of any teleological analy-
sis will eventually close at the top. See T. AQUINAS, Swnma Contra Gentiles, in INTRODUC-
TION TO ST. THoMAS AQUINAS 435-37 (A. Pegis ed. 1948).
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theretofore unconscious. Third, such explanatory analyses are
generally subject to reasonable debate. Sometimes one cannot
achieve complete certainty even with respect to one's own motiva-
tions. This does not mean that no correct teleological analysis of
such an action exists, but it does mean that the correct analysis is
sometimes shrouded in ambiguity. Finally, at some point in the
teleological sequence of means and ends one will invariably find
oneself characterizing objectives in terms of desires.
This last point may be explained by an analysis of the motiva-
tional structure of a lawyer's act of driving to his or her law firm
on a particular morning at 6:30: "My immediate objective is to
arrive at the firm by 7:00. My objective in arriving at the firm by
7:00 is to accomplish a great deal of work. My objective in accom-
plishing all this work today is that I have additional work for to-
morrow that cannot be done until I get today's work out of the
way. My objective in doing a great deal of work tomorrow is to
maintain a very high level of productivity in my work at the firm.
My objective in maintaining a high level of productivity is to im-
press the partners who will eventually be passing on the question
of my being made a partner. The reason I want to impress the
partners is that I want to be a partner. The reason I want to be
made a partner is that I want to be successful in a way that those I
respect count as successful. The reason I want to achieve status in
the eyes of those I respect is that I want to have a sense of meaning
in life and I feel that without such approval I will not find a sense
of meaning. Etc., etc." Notice how the seemingly impersonal lan-
guage of objectives and intentions quickly merges into language of
want and desire. This is what one would expect given the fact that
objectives and intentions are always grounded in subjective needs
and desires.
Consider the ways in which one might critically evaluate the
motivational structure of an action. One way is to evaluate the
alleged means-ends relationships. If in the teleological structure of
the action X was chosen as a means to Y, one might challenge the
justifiability of that belief. That is, one might attempt to deter-
mine whether X is a reasonable means of attaining Y. This kind of
evaluation requires one to think about the nature of the world
and, in particular, about causal relationships.
Second, one can critically evaluate the desirability of the ends
by attempting to determine whether seeking those ends is consis-
tent with the ideal of a truly fulfilled human life. Here the ques-
tion is whether seeking a particular end would tend to promote, or
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be an integral part of, intrinsic human good, where intrinsic
human good is defined as the harmonious fulfillment of one's es-
sential capacities and powers.
0 3
How might one respond to a challenge of the desirability of one
of these ends? One would try to justify one's pursuit of the end by
arguing that it is a constituent of at least one's own intrinsic good.
That is, one would claim that pursuing a particular end is an inte-
gral part of seeking the truly good existence for oneself; it is an end
that arises from one's own specific essence. If this is correct then
the overall schematic structure of such a justificatory argument
would look something like this: "I did X to achieve Y which I
sought to achieve Z which, . . ., to achieve Z,, which I believe is
intrinsically desirable in that it is an integral part of the intrinsi-
cally good human existence as definable for my own case."
It follows that the attempt to justify morally one's own action
requires one to make assertions at least about one's own essence,
i~e., about the nature of the intrinsic good as definable for one's
own case. The question is whether one can stop with this. Is one
compelled to generalize from one's own case to assertions about
the nature of the human essence as such? I think that one is so
compelled. In claiming that an end is part of one's own intrinsic
good, one is at the very least claiming that one's pursuit of it is
itself part of the intrinsic good, that one's fulfillment in this partic-
ular respect is an intrinsic good in itself even from the standpoint
of the world as a whole. That is, the claim must be that somehow
the world as such increases in value by the fact that one derives
fulfillment in this particular respect. In addition, suppose someone
claims that fulfillment of a particular desire is part of his own in-
trinsic good but of no one else's, presumably because the desire is
unique to his own case. But then he must at least be asserting that
it is part of the general human essence to have the freedom to pur-
sue whatever happens to be one's own unique desires.
Finally, an even stronger claim can be made. If one discovers
within oneself a desire that superficially appears unique to one's
own psyche, I think the inevitable tendency is to believe either that
similar desires are buried below the level of consciousness in others
or else that one has been given a greater share of the human es-
sence than others, that is, of the common capacities, powers, and
desires that define the human condition.
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What is the structure of an explanatory practical argument after
completion of an effort to morally justify choice? The argument
can be cast in the following schematic form:
1) Fulfillment of desire A is part of the human essence; i.e.,
fulfilling X is an intrinsically desirable activity.
2) Doing B is either a necessary or useful means to the fulfill-
ment of A.
n) Doing N is either a necessary or useful means to the attain-
ment of N-1.
Therefore: my doing N is morally justifiable.
I shall refer to an argument of this form as an evaluative or justifi-
catory practical argument.
There is no obvious deductive relationship between the premises
and the conclusion of such an argument. It does not seem that
affirming the premises while denying the conclusion results in a
logical contradiction. But this does not mean that such inferences
are irrational or groundless. They are no more groundless than an
inference such as concluding there exists a red ball on the front
lawn from the belief-premise that there now appears to be a red
ball on the front lawn. The realm of justifiable belief is not limited
to the realm of deductive inference.
In addition, this analysis of the concept of an evaluative practi-
cal argument illustrates the sense in which conclusions about
moral obligations and values must be grounded in metaphysical
assertions about the nature of reality. The ultimate premise of
such an argument is a claim about the nature of the human es-
sence, and whatever else such a claim comes to, it is at least a met-
aphysical claim. On the other hand, the conclusion of such an
argument is a statement about moral justifiability or obligation.
Thus, the schematic form exhibits the inevitable transition from
metaphysical to moral assertion. Hence, the inference from fact to
value that Hume10 4 and his descendants have decried is a neces-
sary element of moral reasoning. The lack of deductive connec-
tions between such metaphysical premises and moral conclusions
ought not concern us. Again, to the extent one accepts the inevita-
104. According to Hume, the essential error involved in attempting to ground value
judgments upon judgments of fact lies in attempting to infer conclusions containing terms
of moral evaluation, such as "ought," from premises that do not contain such terms. See
D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 455-76 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888). For a
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bility of practical reasoning one commits oneself to the proposition
that many of one's most important beliefs do not rest solely upon
deductive inferences.
It is instructive to note the differences between explanatory and
evaluative practical arguments. First, the form of conclusion dif-
fers. The conclusion of an explanatory practical argument is a de-
cision, while that of an evaluative practical argument is a claim
that a particular decision is morally justifiable. Second, the form
of the intermediate means-end premises differs. The intermediate
premises of an explanatory practical argument have the form of
subjective belief-statements; those of an evaluative practical argu-
ment are claims about the nature of reality. Finally, the ultimate
premises vary. The first premise of an explanatory practical argu-
ment is a statement of subjective desire; that of an evaluative prac-
tical argument is an assertion about the objective nature of the
intrinsic human good.
The concept of a justificatory practical argument has far greater
application than evaluation of decisions already made. It applies
as well to the evaluation of decisions that could have been, but
were not, made. Once one turns from the task of articulating the
teleological structure of action to that ofjustifying past action with
evaluative practical argument, one is necessarily drawn into the
consideration of alternative actions that might have been, but
were not, chosen. And each such alternative in turns calls implic-
itly for evaluative practical arguments that might be marshalled in
support. Thus, once one asks the question, "Was that action justi-
fiable?," one cannot avoid asking the further question, "What
were the available alternatives, and were any of them more justifi-
able than the one I chose?"
Similarly, contemplation of choices yet to be made calls forth
justificatory practical argumentation. Ideally, one begins consid-
ered reflection about a choice to be made in the future by sorting
out the major alternative choices. For each alternative, in turn,
one looks for appropriate evaluative practical arguments in sup-
port of that choice. It is on the basis of a comparison of such alter-
native justifications that one makes a morally considered
judgment. The problem becomes one of evaluating the justifica-
tory practical arguments that can be proposed in support of each
alternative and choosing the alternative with the strongest
support.
Is the activity of moral reflection, as explicated here, potentially
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rational? In what sense, if any, can one legitimately characterize
justificatory practical arguments as valid or invalid?
Consider the first-person case in which one evaluates the moral
justifiability of one's own act. Surely the appeal to the intermedi-
ate means-ends steps raise objectively resolvable questions. Such
claims make causal assertions about the world and are confirmable
or disconfirmable by reference to the objective causal order. This
is not to say that resolution of such premises is always, or even
usually, easy or noncontroversial. But to deny the possibility of
arriving at an objective conclusion about the relationship between
one's ends and alternative means would be to commit oneself to
understanding human existence as a hopeless game in which one is
arbitrarily saddled with desires but given no methods for deter-
mining ways in which any of them might be satisfied. We do not
perceive our condition in this way. Does anyone doubt that, given
a desire for food, one can objectively determine that eating a sand-
wich is an appropriate means of satisfying that desire?
What about the assertions of intrinsic desirability, the claims
purporting to characterize the human essence as such? The ques-
tion to ask oneself here is: What would it be like to deny the possi-
bility of finding the truth about such claims? Presumably it would
be to deny the possibility of an integrated life of well-being. It is
one thing to deny that one has an integrated life; it is another to
deny the very possibility of knowing what such well-being might
be. Try to imagine convincing oneself that although one finds
oneself with a complex of needs and desires there is no possible
way of discovering which of those desires, if fulfilled, would lead to
a deeper level of well-being than others. The very act of continu-
ing to exert oneself in action contradicts any such attempt. It is a
necessity of thought that one can, through effort, discover those
desires within oneself that comprise one's own essence, i.e., those
desires that yield ends which, in turn, constitute the intrinsically
desirable for one's own case. But this is to say that in some sense
one seeks the ultimate good in everything one does and cannot
help believing that such a good exists, even if one is in doubt as to
its nature or as to the practical feasibility of achieving it in one's
concrete situation.
This argument can be formulated alternatively as follows: In
the very process of living, one necessarily becomes aware of the
difference between well-being and its absence; one learns to distin-
guish states of awareness that tend toward integration from those
that do not. This is part of what it means to be a being with emo-
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tional states. In this process of learning to distinguish well-being
from its opposite, one learns at the same time that certain modes of
activity tend to yield well-being while others tend to yield the op-
posite. What could account for this? The only plausible explana-
tion is that one possesses a deep essence constituted by a complex
of needs and desires, the fulfillment of which tends to lead to well-
being and integration. Hence, one is driven to postulate the exist-
ence of such an essence within oneself and to recognize that the
ultimate objective in all of one's activities is to realize that essence.
But if this is the case, propositions about the nature of that essence
are capable, in principle, of confirmation or disconfirmation.
With this, one comes close to the core of the natural law concep-
tion that was one of Plato's central concerns. 0 5 In all of one's ac-
tions one seeks the ultimate good. One might not know in any
great detail what this ultimate good is; sometimes one has very
little idea whatsoever. But it is part of our deepest conviction
about our metaphysical situation that an ultimate good does exist
and that to the extent one discovers its nature and realizes it
through patterns of action, one will achieve integration and well-
being. Thus, not only is it the case that all human action is intrin-
sically teleological in the sense that in all action one seeks to
achieve purposes, but our central concern in pursuing objectives is
to realize ultimate good. And ultimate good, in turn, is believed to
be a mode of human activity which, if achieved, would fulfill those
needs and desires that define the human essence.
If the process of moral reflection is rational, the question arises
as to the appropriate methods for engaging in such activity. How
should one go about ascertaining the truth about the nature of
intrinsic human good and the conditions necessary or useful for its
attainment? Of course, there is no short answer to this question.
Certainly part of any adequate method involves experimentation
and introspection. As one lives, one finds oneself pursuing a vari-
ety of desires and felt needs, and in so doing, one has an opportu-
nity to examine one's own states of awareness and the
consequences of pursuing certain ends in certain ways. This pro-
cess of self-education, if undertaken consistently and in a disci-
plined manner, will shed light on the nature both of one's human
essence and the conditions useful or necessary for fulfilling that
essence.
Another element of any adequate method is observation of the
105. See PLATO, GORGIAS (W. Hamilton trans. 1960).
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experiences of others, both in the present and in history. One does
not need literally to experiment with all possible modes of exist-
ence to learn that at least some can be ruled out either as not aim-
ing at intrinsic needs or as not constituting necessary or useful
means to the attainment of essential needs.
An important qualification should be made at this point. I have
been arguing for the possibility of objective moral knowledge. But
I also want to concede the difficulty and obscurity inherent in the
task of acquiring such knowledge. It is common for one to be mis-
taken about the intrinsic human good. It is possible to spend a
lifetime pursuing ends that prove to be outside the class of essential
human needs. In addition, it is possible to seek intrinsic good by,
unreasonable means for achieving such good. Thus, even if one
understands to some extent the nature of ultimate good, one can
easily be mistaken about the appropriate means of realizing that
good. The process of moral reflection in one sense is a task that
cannot be completed. Progress in moral knowledge is attainable
but final clarity and certainty is not. Hence, a measure of skepti-
cism about the possibility of final moral certainty is part of a ma-
ture moral awareness.
What about the objectivity of moral reflection about the actions
of others? Here the problem is one of evaluating the intermediate
means-end premises and the premises of ultimate desirability in
someone else's justificatory practical argument. The presupposi-
tion of the very effort to evaluate critically another's claim to be
pursuing an intrinsically desirable end is that both parties share
the same fundamental essence. That is, one assumes that those
ends that one has discovered to be intrinsically desirable in one's
own case are as ultimately desirable for others. This assumption is
not only shared by everyone; it is a rational assumption. For,
given one's recognition of another's humanity, it is surely plausible
to generalize from one's own self-knowledge to conclusions about
the other's intrinsic good. What could sharing the attribute of hu-
manity be except sharing the same essence, the same fundamental
complex of needs and desires the fulfillment of which constitutes
intrinsic human good?
10 6
In one sense, moral reflection in a social context is more difficult
due to the difficulties of understanding the language and experi-
106. Of course, it must be remembered that this point concerns intrinsically desirable
ends, not ends that serve other ends. Thus, facts such as X liking ice cream and Y dislik-
ing ice cream do not constitute counterexamples.
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ence of others. But that one nevertheless lives with a belief in the
possibility of objective moral knowledge sharable by persons seems
a necessity of thought. If one believes that one can, with effort,
acquire moral knowledge about one's own intrinsic good, one nat-
urally and justifiably finds oneself believing that knowledge ac-
quired in this way is applicable to the lives of others and is, in
principle, capable of being communicated to them.
And of course this is not a one-way affair. Not only does one
assume that moral knowledge one discovers for oneself is commu-
nicable and applicable to others, one also finds that moral knowl-
edge acquired by others can be usefully communicated to oneself.
Thus, the process of moral self-education is a communal process.
If the foregoing is correct, one can understand the sense in
which moral reasoning is objective but incapable of absolute cer-
tainty. It is objective in the sense that an objective human essence
exists that is composed of a complex of deep needs and desires, the
fulfillment of which by certain patterns of activity yields inte-
grated: well-being. It is incapable of mathematical certainty both
because one can never be sure of the total configuration of the
human essence (ze., of intrinsic good) and also because one is often
uncertain about the causal relationship between means and ends.
To apply this analysis to legal reasoning one must consider the
concept of a pattern of action. One engages in a pattern of action
to the extent to which one repeatedly acts in the same, or similar,
way in response to a given type of situation. One who invariably
shakes hands when introduced engages in a pattern of action; the
same holds for one who cannot look at a tree without meditating.
Like discrete acts, patterns of action are teleological; that is, they
are explicable by reference to underlying purposes toward which
they are directed. And as with discrete acts, they cannot be fully
understood without reference to those underlying purposes.
Consider a pattern not generally shared by a community of per-
sons, that is, a pattern uniquely characteristic of a particular indi-
vidual. Here the process of explicating the teleological structure is
the same as for the case of a discrete action. The underlying pur-
poses may be, and often are, unconscious, but can in principle be
brought to the surface. These underlying purposes, in turn, are
directed toward the fulfillment of underlying needs and desires.
Once the teleological structure of the pattern is uncovered, it can
be critically evaluated. If defended, the explanatory practical ar-
gument will be converted into an evaluative practical argument.
[Vol. 7
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And this evaluative practical argument, in turn, is subject to criti-
cal evaluation both with respect to the intermediate means-end
steps and the ultimate premise. As is the case with discrete acts,
the critical evaluation of an existing pattern of action tends to lead
to consideration of alternative patterns that might be morally su-
perior. One naturally is led to consider possible ways of modifying
one's patterns of conduct in the effort to more fully realize intrinsic
good.
A difference between unconscious and conscious purposes exists
with respect to guidance of conduct with a pattern. Conduct is
guided in either case but the nature of the guidance differs. An
unconscious purpose guides conduct below the level of conscious
awareness. There is no possibility for reflective consideration
about the different ways in which the pattern might be expressed
in a given situation, or about the pattern's appropriateness in an-
other. When a pattern is conscious, the individual deliberately
guides himself by a normative standard of conduct that he is able
to hold before his consciousness when he chooses whether, and in
what manner, to engage in the pattern on a given occasion. When
the guidance provided by a pattern becomes conscious, we find
ourselves talking about a normative rule of action. Here we seem
to be referring to a directive formulable in words by the person
whose conduct is guided by the rule.
A pattern that has become conscious may be action-guiding in
two contrasting ways. On the one hand, the pattern may be un-
derstood by the individual primarily in terms of its actual compo-
nents. On the other hand, it may be understood primarily in
terms of the underlying purpose or purposes that it serves to pro-
mote. For example, imagine someone who regularly does push-ups
whenever a convenient opportunity presents itself. On the one
hand, he may understand this practice primarily in terms of the
physical movements necessary. On the other hand, he may under-
stand it in terms of the underlying purposes the practice serves for
him. If he understands it solely in the former way, occasions will
arise when he is unsure whether to engage in the practice; that is,
whether a "convenient opportunity" has in fact presented itself. If
he is aware of the underlying purpose grounding the practice in his
own psyche, then such uncertainties would be more easily resolva-
ble. If his primary purpose is one of strengthening his muscles,
lungs and heart, and he is aware of this, then the concept of conve-
nient opportunity will tend to mean one thing. On the other
hand, if the conscious purpose is calming himself in times of anxi-
1981]
31
Pannier: The Nature of the Judicial Process and Judicial Discretion
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
ety, then the concept of convenient opportunity will tend to mean
something else.
Two conceptions of a normative rule emerge from this distinc-
tion between modes of conscious awareness of a pattern. The first
mode of awareness gives rise to the conception of rules as somehow
applying themselves. Rules are disembodied; they apply them-
selves and we have only to follow their lead. The second mode of
awareness suggests a very different understanding of normative
rules. Here the central fact is not the rule but the purpose. The
underlying objective or aim served by a rule is kept in the forefront
of attention. The mechanics of the rule are seen as devices for
working toward an objective. In the first mode of awareness rules
are seen as the primary phenomenon; purposes as secondary. In
the second mode, it is purposes that are primary.
0 7
A related point concerns divergent attitudes toward the ideal
formulation of a normative rule. The first approach tends to see
the ideal form of a rule as one setting forth explicitly all possible
sets of circumstances that would constitute proper occasions for
application of the rule. The latter approach does not concern itself
with such matters; it is enough to have the central purpose in
mind. The contingent circumstances will take care of themselves
when evaluated in terms of the underlying objective.
An alternative way of making this contrast is by distinguishing
between code moralities and moralities of purpose. A code moral-
ity conceives of the moral life as primarily a matter of following
rules. A morality of purpose understands moral existence as a
matter of pursuing objectives. On the latter view, rules and princi-
ples are of little epistemological help except as convenient rules of
thumb for situations in which there is little or no time for the kind
of reflection needed carefully to determine how to pursue a given
purpose in a concrete case.
One who leans toward a code view of morality will tend to un-
derstand the legal system in the same terms, zle., will tend to un-
derstand a set of laws as a set of rules whose proper range of
application is somehow already contained within themselves. In
contrast, one who understands moral choice in terms of underlying
purposes will tend to understand the legal system in the same tele-
ological way. A code-oriented jurist will tend to put the question
107. I do not mean to suggest that the mechanical following of a rule is behavior with-
out purpose. The point is that the underlying purpose is likely to differ from that of one
following a rule with a teleological awareness.
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of interpretation in terms such as, "How does rule Z apply in this
situation?" A purpose-oriented jurist will tend to express the issue
of interpretation differently: "Given that X is the most plausible
and justifiable objective to be served by rule A, how should I inter-
pret A in this situation so as to best promote X?"18
Now consider the case of a pattern of action that is shared by a
group of persons. Understanding the nature of this phenomenon is
crucial to any understanding of legal reasoning. In accordance
with the earlier analysis, one would expect that shared patterns,
like individual patterns, are explicable on the basis of underlying
purposes those patterns are believed to serve. But one of the diffi-
culties is in ascertaining the purposes pursued by a commonly
shared pattern. Whose purposes should one consider? Should one
assume that all of those who share a particular pattern of action
share a single purpose?
Here it is important to distinguish the public aspect of a pattern
of activity from its underlying objective. Persons may share the
public dimension of a pattern without sharing an underlying pur-
pose. For example, consider two individuals who customarily read
poetry for one-half hour each day. One person does this with the
intention of deepening the experience of reality; the other is trying
to impress someone. Here there would be an identity of public
practice but a nonidentity of purpose. Of course, one could say
that in some sense two different patterns of action are present in
such a case, and that part of what it is to characterize a pattern of
action is specification of the underlying intentions. But because I
want to bring out the possibility of individuals' sharing some, but
not all, dimensions of a practice, I choose to follow the former
usage.
This consideration suggests a fundamental feature of a complex
social order such as ours. Participants in such an order may be
pursuing different life-purposes and radically different world
views. But as bound together in a common social enterprise they
necessarily share something, namely the public dimensions of cer-
tain practices and patterns of action. But they share these with
possibly very different motivations.
108. For a helpful discussion of this distinction, see R. TAYLOR, GOOD AND EVIL 161-
85 (1970). The contrast between code moralities and moralities of purpose is also relevant
to the debate between the act and rule-utilitarians and to the issue of intuitionism in
ethics. For a discussion of code moralities, see J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM
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In a complex society all participants probably will rarely engage
in any practice with a single objective. But it is also probably true
that for a pattern to survive it must be used by a substantial pro-
portion of those engaging in a pattern with similar motivations.
What does this imply regarding the primary purpose motivating
a given pattern of action? If it is unusual for any particular prac-
tice to be engaged in by all with a single objective, then in what
sense can we even seek an underlying objective? On one level the
answer can only be that we must explicate all the underlying moti-
vations supporting the pattern. One could still single out for spe-
cial scrutiny purposes that seem to be shared by the largest
proportion of participants, but until one understands the other
purposes constituting motivation for compliance with the practice
there is a sense in which one does not yet truly understand the
practice. And this is only what one should expect, given the fact
that human acts and institutions (including practices) are teleolog-
ical in nature and hence can be understood only in terms of under-
lying purposes.
From this it follows, in turn, that the product of such an analysis
would be a set of explanatory practical arguments, a set of descrip-
tive explanations of the public dimension of the pattern in terms of
the varying underlying teleological considerations. In addition,
each such explanatory argument could be transformed into an
evaluative argument. And each of the latter are subject to critical
examination with respect to both the intermediate and ultimate
premises. This process in turn leads to reflection about the ulti-
mate moral justifiability of the pattern and about the question of
whether the pattern might better be replaced with another. Thus,
the process of moral evaluation of patterns leads to reflection
about the future direction of the social order itself.
Some fundamental propositions about life in a social order can
now be made. A society is definable in terms of its set of practices
and patterns of action. These patterns range from relatively sim-
ple practices, such as excusing oneself when sneezing, to complex
patterns such as enacting legislation, proving mathematical theo-
rems, and meditating on the explanation for there being anything
at all.109 A large proportion of one's waking moments are occu-
109. For a very influential essay on the importance for human life of meditation on the
ground of contingent being, see M. HEIDEGGER, What i Metaphysics?, in EXISTENCE AND
BEiNG 325-61 (W. Brock ed. 1949).
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pied with patterns. Thus, the nature of the patterns tending to
define a social order is an important question.
A member of a complex social order is continually faced with
moral choices concerning the available patterns that comprise that
order. One is faced with moral questions concerning every use of
personal time. Social patterns bid for personal time; to engage in a
pattern of practice is a mode of using time. With respect to any
particular pattern one has, in principle, two kinds of moral
choices. First, the question arises whether one should participate
in the pattern at all. Second, there is the question as to how one
shoilld participate in the patterns one selects. The second kind of
choice involves such questions as the motivation with which one
should participate, the kinds of circumstances in which one should
find the pattern appropriate, and the attitude one should try to
convey to others about one's evaluation of the practice. Such
moral questions are necessarily resolved by action in one way or
another by every participant in a social order, whether or not one
has consciously faced them.
As Heidegger has argued," l0 an individual is definable in terms
of the ultimate purposes he pursues. This complex of ultimate
purposes constitutes a fundamental project"' in terms of which
the agent organizes action, thought, feeling, and experience."l 2
Such a fundamental project incorporates a particular understand-
ing of reality (a metaphysical world view) and a particular set of
emotional responses to reality as thus perceived.' 13 The relevant
point for our purposes is that one tends to interpret all phenom-
ena, including one's own experiences, in terms of one's fundamen-
tal project.
This tendency also includes the tendency to so interpret social
norms and patterns. Given any particular pattern, one tends to
understand it in light of one's own fundamental orientation to-
ward the world. This understanding will express itself in at least
two dimensions. First, if one chooses to participate in a pattern
110. See M. HEIDEGGER, supra note 93, at §§ 14-18.
111. See J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 433-556 (H. Barnes trans. 1956).
112. It might be asked how fundamental projects could ever differ among themselves.
For, is it not the natural law position that all persons seek the ultimate human good? This
may be true, but the point is that not everyone seeks the ultimate good in the same man-
ner. A fundamental project is the way in which an individual goes about seeking intrinsic
good. One has only to contrast fundamental projects such as greed, combat, accumulating
wealth, and sainthood to see that great variation is possible.
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one will do so with a motivation consistent with one's own funda-
mental project. This means, in part, that the explanatory practi-
cal argument that would lay bare the teleological structure of that
participation will cohere with the fundamental project of the indi-
vidual. Second, one will tend morally to evaluate patterns in ac-
cordance with one's own fundamental project; that is, one's
response to the alternative evaluative arguments that could be of-
fered in support of the practice will tend to cohere with one's fun-
damental project.
But one's fundamental project defines the basic mode in which
one uses personal time. Hence, one will tend to construe social
patterns in light of one's own fundamental modes of using time.
One's own fundamental modes of using time constitute one's mo-
rality, however. Hence, one inevitably understands social patterns
in light of one's own moral understanding.
It follows that reality is ambiguous in the sense that no predeter-
mined meanings are forced upon one. The meaning of a phenom-
enon for an individual arises out of his fundamental project.
Ambiguity is resolved, if at all, only through interaction between
phenomenon and fundamental orientation. I do not reject the
possibility of the existence of objective truths about the world; but
I do reject the suggestion that an objective order of meaning and
truth is forced upon us.
What is the nature of a society given the foregoing account of
human action? A society is comprised of a class of individuals,
each of whom strives to realize his or her potential in terms of his
or her fundamental project. This striving expresses itself in modes
of using time-in particular, patterns of action. With every dis-
crete act, an individual strengthens certain patterns within himself
and weakens others. The power of a pattern increases with repeti-
tion. The influence upon an individual by the examples set by
others following patterns of their own is also strong. Other things
being equal, one tends unconsciously to assimilate patterns that
prevail in the social order of which he is a member. Thus, every
discrete act taken by an individual bears at least two kinds of
causal influence: an interior effect upon his own experience and
action, and an exterior effect upon the patterns of others. In short,
one way of understanding a social order is to see it as a collective
effort to create, reinforce, eliminate, or weaken various practices
and patterns of action. A social order is the collective enterprise of
creating and sustaining modes of using time. Thus, a social order
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must be seen as a collective effort to create a moral order, since
modes of using time are modes of moral order.
But this does not mean that a social order is a collective effort to
create any particular moral order. From the fact that each mem-
ber is pursuing a fundamental project, it follows that each is pur-
suing a vision of the good, Le., of the intrinsically good human life.
But it does not follow that all are pursuing the same vision. What
binds us together is the common human enterprise of striving to
realize the good; what that good comes to is obviously a matter of
conflict. With every discrete act, everyone contributes in some
measure to the modes in which time is shaped and directed by the
social order. Modes that are strengthened by a discrete act will
conflict with modes promoted by those who pursue different un-
derstandings of the good.
Thus, to exist is to act. To act is to make moral choices arising
from a fundamental project embodying a particular vision of the
good. There is no consensus with respect to ultimate good. Hence,
action within a social order is a matter of conflict. Concrete action
necessarily contributes to the strengthening of certain patterns and
the weakening of others. The total social outcome is beyond the
control of any single participant and is the product of conflicting
visions of the good.
Now consider the role of a judge in a complex society. The first
fact to notice is that in deciding a case a judge is acting. Hence,
the foregoing analysis of human action applies to the activity of
deciding cases. In particular, the concepts of explanatory and
evaluative arguments apply.
The teleological structure of a judicial decision can be analyzed
by an explanatory practical argument. The conclusion of such an
argument is the decision reached by the court-the act of resolving
the case in a particular way. The remainder of the argument con-
sists of statements concerning relationships between means and
ends, and a premise setting out an end experienced as ultimate.
Of course, no claim is made that all aspects of the teleological
structure of a judicial decision are conscious. But that there is such
an explanatory structure is a presupposition of the belief that
human action is purposeful.
Imagine an outline of the explanatory practical argument that
might be offered by a judge after applying a particular statute in
resolution of a case. (For simplicity I shall not put the account
into the more formal mode.)
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1) I have decided X.
2) I have decided X because of all the possible ways of inter-
preting statute Y, I believe X to be the best.
3) I think X is the best of the alternative interpretations be-
cause I believe it to be most consistent with my moral un-
derstanding of what a law expressed in this form of words
ought to be attempting.
4) The reason I want to choose what I take to be the best
possible interpretation of Y is that I want to fulfill my
moral obligation as a judge, which obligation includes
choosing the best possible interpretations of statutory
laxguage.
5) I want to fulfill what I take to be my moral obligation as a
judge because I believe that the judicial system is poten-
tially a social good and I want to contribute to its
effectiveness.
6) I want to contribute to the effectiveness of the judicial sys-
tem because I think such contribution is a useful means of
contributing to the formation of social conditions which
are either necessary or useful to the attainment of the com-
mon (intrinsic) good for all, and I want to do what I can to
help bring about such conditions.
7) I want to help bring about such conditions because I be-
lieve that doing so will, in part, help fulfill my capacity for
creating intrinsic good and I want to do what I can to real-
ize that capacity through action.
8) I want to do what I can to realize my essential capacities
through action because only in this way can I hope to
achieve integration.
Of course, this is not a complete teleological analysis of a judi-
cial decision. For one thing, I have ignored the fact that any judi-
cial decision incorporates many subordinate decisions upon which
the primary decision is based. For example, as a predicate of the
decision about the application of statute Y, the judge may have
rejected a claim that such an application would violate the Consti-
tution. This is itself a choice and can be given an explanatory
teleological account involving beliefs and desires about the proper
interpretation of the Constitution.
Given the appropriate explication of the teleological structure of
a judicial decision, one can see how, as before, the explanatory
argument is convertible into an evaluative argument by imagining
the judge attempting to justify the decision. The ultimate premise
is convertible into a statement of belief about an intrinsicially de-
sirable end. The intermediate means-ends premises are converti-
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ble into statements that the alleged means-end relationships are
rationally supportable. And the conclusion is convertible from a
choice to a statement that one has a good reason for making that
choice.
Thus, a judicial decision is intrinsically a moral decision. A ju-
dicial decision is a human act. An act is a mode of using personal
time. A mode of using personal time is a moral decision made in
accordance with a hierarchy of purposes and desires constituting a
fundamental project which itself constitutes a particular vision of
the good. These generalizations are applicable to some of the
more particular aspects of judicial decisionmaking.
Consider the process by which a court ascertains the facts in a
case. It is commonplace that any event can be described in alter-
native ways. One tends to describe a situation in light of those
aspects that one tends to notice, and one tends to take special no-
tice of those aspects relevant to one's own interests. One's own
interests, in turn, are shaped by one's own underlying purposes
and objectives, and ultimately by one's own fundamental project.
Hence, there is a sense in which one's personal vision of the good
influences the things one tends to notice and hence the descriptions
of events one tends to give.
In what ways does a court's teleological understanding influence
its use of the rules applied in resolution of the case? For one thing,
the class of rules and principles a court deems relevant for consid-
eration in a case is a function of its own beliefs and purposes con-
cerning the legal system and social order. One cannot read from
the facts the rules that should be taken into account. The class of
such rules is shaped by the court's fundamental project, since
whatever decision is rendered, its teleological structure must be ex-
plicable in terms of an explanatory practical argument which in
turn will mirror the underlying teleology of the court.
It might be conceded by some that the set of rules that a court
deems relevant to the resolution of a case tends to be a function of
the court's own teleological orientation. But some may argue that
the total class of rules and principles from which a court makes
such a selection is not itself a function of the court's own vision of
the good. The total matrix of rules and principles is imposed on a
court from the outside, so to speak. The total set of legal rules is
imposed by the social order; the court's role is simply one of ac-
cepting and applying those rules. Furthermore, once a court de-
termines that a particular rule or principle is relevant to the
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resolution of a case, its application is beyond the discretion of the
judge. Not only are legal rules themselves a product of a social
order external to the court, but their interpretation and applica-
tion is as well.
To see why such objections are mistaken, it is necessary to con-
sider the nature of legal rules themselves and the ways in which
they are appropriately used.
A society's system of legal rules is best understood as a subset of
its total complex of normative patterns of action. A social order is
a complex matrix of normative patterns of action. Most of these
are nonlegal in nature. A legal system grows out of underlying
nonlegal norms. Thus, the foregoing analysis of nonlegal norms is
relevant to an analysis of legal norms.
As with any normative pattern, a legal norm can be understood
in two ways. On the one hand, one can approach it on its own
literal terms, so to speak. That is, one can try to understand the
rule as a directive to take certain action upon the occurrence of
certain conditions. One can take a legal rule as a directive to be
followed mechanically without attention to underlying purposes
motivating the creation of the rule. On the other hand, one can
try to understand the application of a rule by reflecting upon the
possible objectives that it serves in the social order.
As a human creation, a legal rule is a means for achieving
human ends. It follows that genuine understanding of a legal rule
requires attention to the underlying purposes the rule is believed to
promote. A legal system is a teleological structure, a complex of
norms serving human ends."l 4 To try to understand a legal system
in the deontological mode as a set of directives to be followed
mechanically without awareness of underlying purposes is an inad-
equate approach. One can neither properly evaluate or apply le-
gal rules without ascending to a teleological level of analysis.
Ascending to the teleological level requires substituting for the pic-
ture of a legal system as a set of abstract rules the conception of
law as a human activity in which individuals pursue purposes that
are shared in some respects and unshared in others.
In this connection, it is helpful to recall the earlier remarks
about the contrast between the external or public form of a so-
cially shared pattern of action and its underlying objective. The
case of legal norms is similar. No legal norms exist in the abstract;
114. For a recent teleological analysis of the concept of a legal system, see I. JENKINS,
SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (1980).
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rather, there are only skeletal frameworks of norms that require
filling out by those who apply these norms in concrete situations.
Consider the case of a legislative rule as applied by a court. A
statute consists of words. But no set of words, no matter how de-
tailed or extensive, could suffice automatically to resolve questions
of the rule's application. A rule cannot apply itself; it can only be
applied by a person. It is a person who applies the rule in a spe-
cific situation that determines the meaning of the rule in that situ-
ation for that individual. A statute can be only a framework or
outline for a rule; it could not be a rule itself. A rule lives only in
and through instances of application. A rule has no being outside
concrete patterns of action incarnated in the acts of persons guid-
ing their conduct by the norm. 1 5
It is true that the words of a statute delimit to some degree the
universe of possible interpretations. Given the dictionary mean-
ings of the terms, there are always some interpretations that could
not reasonably be made by a native speaker of the language. (E.g.,
imagine attempting to apply a rule that an automobile driver
must signal before turning so as to find criminally liable a pedes-
trian who did not signal his intention to leave the sidewalk along a
street and turn toward the front door of a house.) On the other
hand, there is inevitably a measure of slackness between the words
and the world, a slackness that can only be taken up by the active
interpretation of a person. Such an active interpretation can be
reasonably made only by reflecting upon the purposes served by
the statute. It is the underlying objective, as ascertained by a
court, that determines whether the words of a statute are appropri-
ately applied in a specific instance.
Assuming that adequate interpretation of a legal rule requires
attention to the underlying objectives the rule is believed to pro-
mote, how should a court go about doing this, and in what sense
does awareness of this process serve to dissolve the picture of courts
mechanically applying rules whose content and modes of applica-
tion are dictated from the outside? At least part of the answer lies
in an examination of the process by which a court seeks to ascer-
tain the underlying purposes of a legal norm.
Here, one is tempted to suppose that since there is a sense in
which a legal system is a set of norms arising from socially shared
115. For a useful discussion of the consequences of this thesis for the prospects of radi-
cal social reform through the law, see id at 109-17.
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purposes and objectives, it is such socially shared purposes that im-
pose limitations upon the interpretative discretion of courts.
In a sense, it is true that courts apply rules that the participants
in the legal order share, and that such rules arise from underlying
purposes. The problem is one of explicating this concept of social
sharing. What are the methods available to a court that is to as-
certain the underlying objective of a statute? There are basically
only two kinds of cases: one in which there is linguistic direction as
to purpose, and one in which there is no such direction.
The case of linguistic direction will consist of purposive lan-
guage in the statute itself. But those charged with the responsibil-
ity for applying the rule have only linguistic forms for guidance.
As argued above, no form of words can alone suffice for the inter-
pretation of a rule; this holds equally for statements of purpose.
The socially shared dimension of a statute is constituted by the
form of language used in the statute. To make a concrete interpre-
tation of the rule, one cannot avoid invoking one's own teleological
understanding. A linguistic statement of purpose lives only in the
concrete instances of its application, and such applications can be
made only by individuals who necessarily use their own world
views in interpreting such forms of language.
An alternative way to make the point is by noting that the prod-
ucts of socially cooperative activity such as legislative enactments
are inherently ambiguous in the same way as are all socially
shared patterns of action. A social practice exists only in concrete
patterns of action engaged in by persons. To say that a socially
shared pattern is fundamentally ambiguous is not a criticism. It is
not as if things could be otherwise. A socially shared pattern is
ambiguous because that is the essential nature of socially shared
patterns, including socially shared statements of purpose.
The need for invoking the court's own teleological understand-
ing in applying a statute becomes even more obvious when no lin-
guistic direction as to statutory purpose is present. Here the court
must try to range before itself all of the possible objectives that
might be thought to be advanced by this particular formulation.
And in most instances, the set of possible objectives will be even
larger than for the case of a statute incorporating purposive
language.
Thus, given any particular form of language used in a rule, al-
ternative purposes that might be served by that formulation will
always exist. Hence, a court cannot avoid choosing among such
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alternatives. But it follows that in interpreting a statute a court
could not possibly be constrained by any socially shared objective;
there are none. In interpreting a statute, all a court has is a form
of language, a mere framework for a rule; the rule itself cannot
exist outside specific interpretive acts.
It is this inherent ambiguity of any linguistic formulation that
accounts for the futility of seeking the legislative "intent" of a stat-
ute. The intent of a legislature, even if such an entity existed,
would be irrelevant for a court seeking to interpret a statute. It
would be irrelevant because it could not possibly be ascertained.
What can be ascertained is the public dimension of the norm,
namely the form of language. And given any form of language,
there will necessarily be alternative teleological orientations with
which the words will cohere." 1
6
Given a set of alternative objectives that could account for a
statutory form of words, the court will tend to choose that objec-
tive that best coheres with its own fundamental orientation. In
particular, it will tend to select that purpose that it believes to be
the most justifiable purpose that the language of the statute could
promote. This tendency is not only inevitable; it is morally justifi-
able. For, given the intrinsic ambiguity of all public dimensions of
norms, there could be no other alternative.
Thus, even at the level at which legal rules are applied, courts
necessarily and continually contribute, by their very acts of inter-
pretation, to the shaping of the legal system. With every concrete
act of interpretation a court contributes to the evolutionary un-
folding of the meaning of that statute. Things could not be other-
wise. In one sense, this is a paridigm of discretion. But in another
sense there is no discretion, if by that term one means to suggest
that the adjudicative process could operate otherwise.
That such complications should surface in the effort to under-
stand the sense in which courts participate in socially shared objec-
tives should not be surprising to one aware of the obscurity of the
very concept of a socially shared purpose itself. What is it for two
people to share a purpose? In what sense, if any, can any two indi-
viduals be certain that they share precisely the same objective?
Part of the difficulty lies in simply understanding what it is for
one to have a purpose. Even for relatively simple purposes, such as
trying to become a skillful lawyer, there is a sense in which one is
116. For a discussion of the distinction between statutory intent and purpose, see L.
CARTER, REASON iN LAW 47-103 (1979).
1981]
43
Pannier: The Nature of the Judicial Process and Judicial Discretion
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
never completely certain about the nature of the purpose ("What
exactly is a skillful lawyer?"), and about the steps that might be
necessary or useful for the attainment of that purpose. If this is
true with respect to objectives such as becoming a skillful lawyer,
how much more is it the case for truly complex purposes such as
striving to build a social order that will promote justice, or trying
to become wise? For purposes like this, one understands the na-
ture of the objective only in the pursuit of it, and since the pursuit
of such an objective is unending, complete certainty is
unattainable.
If certainty about one's own purposes is unattainable, the prob-
lem becomes qualitatively more difficult when it comes to the mat-
ter of sharing purposes with others. Here, in the final analysis, all
one has to rely upon are external indications of the other's purpose
("public dimensions" of the purpose). Two might agree on a lin-
guistic formulation of a common purpose (e.g., "We ought to work
to promote a social order in which the minimum essential needs of
all citizens are met."), but nevertheless could be far from certain
whether they share an identical objective. The only way in which
the participants in a purportedly common purpose can work to-
ward an understanding of each other's intentions is for each to
venture interpretations of the common purpose. (Eg., "You say
you agree that the minimum essential needs must be met. But
does that mean that you would support a measure that provides
free medical care for all citizens? That's part of what fulfilling the
purpose means to me.") But this illustrates again the fundamental
proposition that the process of mutually sharing an objective in-
volves the participants' own teleological frameworks-their funda-
mental projects.
In addition, this process of mutually offering interpretations of a
common purpose tends to modify those subjective interpretations
themselves. Each participant in the common enterprise of sharing
an objective may tend to modify his own conception of that objec-
tive as he comes to understand more of the others' pictures of the
shared purpose. However, this process of mutual education could
never result in a certainty that two persons shared precisely the
same understanding of a purpose, because the only way in which
two persons can arrive at mutual clarity about a common purpose
is to discuss how the purpose should be instantiated in a specific
situation. But there could never be an end to the possible contexts
of application. No matter how many hypotheticals have been dis-
cussed and agreed upon, it will always be possible to think of an-
other. This does not mean that one could have a purpose
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completely articulated in one's own mind, with only the specific
applications remaining to be made. Rather, the purpose itself ex-
ists only insofar as it is applied.
Thus, purposes are capable of indefinite expansion of meaning.
It follows that the same must hold for norms, practices, and rules.
But this insight provides yet another reason for rejecting the pic-
ture of a legal system as a shared set of abstract principles binding
the members of the social order. A norm exists only insofar as is
applied in particular contexts by one following the norm. Since
there are always an indefinite number of possible contexts of appli-
cation, two persons could never be certain that they completely
agree upon the interpretation of a rule. Hence, it is better to con-
ceive a legal system as a social activity in which participants argue
and discuss the infinitely expanding meaning of shared norms on
the basis of individually held world views.
These considerations help explain why legal reasoning could not
be deductive. Perhaps the primary reason for the common belief
that it is deductive is our habit of analyzing judicial decisions in
terms of the deductive inference scheme, modus ponens (z'e., "If P,
and if P implies Q then Q."). The legal rule relied upon by a
court in resolving a case is understood as having the general form,
"If such-and-such circumstances obtain then such-and-such legal
consequences follow," which in turn has the form, "If P then Q."
The facts as found by the court are then seen as the antecedent of
the if-then proposition, ie., as P. The conclusion, Q, then follows
deductively. The weakness of this analysis is its superficiality. As
argued above, the interesting and controversial aspects of a judi-
cial argument always lie in the possible justifications that could be
offered in support of the premises, "If P then Q," and "Q." And
such justifications, being necessarily of a teleological nature, could
not possibly be deductive. Inference-steps asserting that certain
means are a reasonable way of achieving certain ends are induc-
tive, and such steps are an inherent component of teleological
arguments.
If a court's teleological understanding of a society and the world
play an intrinsic role in the interpretation of a statute, then, a for-
tiori, it plays an intrinsic role in the modification of common
law" 7 or a reinterpretation of the Constitution. The court will at-
117. A natural law theory of common-law adjudication would be more complicated
but similar to that just sketched for the case of statutory interpretation. In common-law
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tempt to justify its decision in such cases by appealing to com-
monly shared principles and purposes, but, as always, the socially
shared dimension of the principles and purposes will require to be
given concrete content by the individual teleology of the
decisionmaker.
Let us now try to determine what the foregoing analysis implies
for the question of judicial discretion and adjudicative rationality.
To summarize briefly, one must understand a judge as a partici-
pant in a social order whose acts share the characteristics possessed
by the acts of all members of the order. Human action is inher-
ently teleological. One acts out a basic understanding of the world
and the significance of human life. Conjoined with this compre-
hensive orientation is a fundamental project-a complex of deep
purposes the pursuit of which constitutes the meaning of life for
the individual. The teleological structure of action can be ana-
lyzed with explanatory practical arguments. One's fundamental
project may or may not be consistent with the human essence-
that complex of deep needs defining the human condition, the ful-
fillment of which is the only means of attaining any measure of
true integration. Philosophical and moral reflection is the sus-
tained effort to contemplate the nature of the human essence and
the means for realizing that essence through activity. Evaluative
practical arguments can be used to articulate the products of such
reflection. The course of moral reflection is often difficult and un-
certain; fallibility is of its essence. One's existence tends to express
itself through modes and patterns of action-habitual and custom-
ary ways of using personal time. Such patterns of action are inher-
ently teleological; they are defined by the subjective purposes and
needs by those engaged in the patterns. That is, patterns are tools
used by an individual as a means of pursuing his fundamental pur-
poses. A pattern of action is not fully characterized until the sub-
jective matrix of purposes and desires giving rise to it are
articulated. The same holds for discrete acts. To act is to take a
concrete step toward the sustaining and strengthening of a particu-
lar life-world, a particular mode of experience and acting in the
world. Each person is continually engaged in the creation of a
universe of meaning. This metaphysical and moral creativity ex-
presses itself both through discrete acts and patterns of action. Be-
cause one expresses one's mode of existence primarily through the
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patterns one lives, reflection upon the nature of these patterns con-
stitutes a vital aspect of philosophical and moral reflection. The
heart of such reflection concerns the question of whether the pat-
terns one finds oneself living are adequate means for realizing the
human essence. A social order consists of a complex matrix of
shared patterns and practices. One should distinguish the public
dimensions of a practice that are shareable from those that lie, of
necessity, within the subjectivity of the individuals participating in
the pattern. No shared patterns exist in the abstract. There are
only patterns given incarnations through the lives of persons guid-
ing their actions with those patterns. One's choice of patterns and
of the ways in which one instantiates them is influenced by the acts
and patterns of others. That is, one's pursuit of the good is inevita-
bly affected by the social consequences flowing from all other indi-
vidual pursuits of the good. The mediation of such effects may be
direct or indirect. Mediation is direct when, for example, one is
killed or assaulted by another. Mediation is indirect when one's
own fundamental orientation is subjectively influenced by the acts
and patterns of others. In such cases the individual is influenced
by what he takes to be the fully instantiated act or pattern of the
other, that is, by what he takes to be the other's underlying pur-
poses and motivation. The interpretation of a pattern is inher-
ently a matter of an individual acting from within his own
teleological orientation toward the world. Each act of interpreta-
tion is intrinsically creative; the interpreter cannot avoid striving
to incarnate his own metaphysical and moral sense of things. The
collective outcome of the social process is beyond the control of
any single individual or group. Every participant in the social or-
der should, upon reflection, recognize the teleological nature of his
own actions and that of the acts of the other members of society.
This means that one should recognize as inevitable the fact that
everyone is continually engaged in efforts to create universes of
meaning. This state of affairs is chaotic in one sense. But the
chaos is not completely unfruitful. It is useful in at least two re-
spects. First, an intrinsic part of realizing the human essence
through activity is the seeking of that essence in freedom. But free-
dom requires the possibility of mistake, of trial and error. Second,
since one's own search for intrinsic good is fallible, one ought to
welcome the illumination that sometimes comes through the coop-
erative endeavor to realize intrinsic good. As participants in the
social order, judges share all of these characteristics. Their distinc-
tion from the rest of us lies in the fact that their political role af-
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fords them much greater potential for the shaping of the social
order. Because they are responsible for the application of the legal
system, judges have the power to shape the content of that system.
I have argued that even when a court purports simply to apply a
statute, it exercises its own fundamental orientation and project.
This teleological creativity also expresses itself on the level of fact-
finding, and, a fortiori, on the level of explicitly setting out to mod-
ify common law or constitutional doctrines. The question arises,
therefore, whether this account of adjudication leaves the resolu-
tion of cases and the development of case law entirely to the unfet-
tered discretion of judges. In what sense can one say that the
process of adjudication is subject to constraints of rationality at
all?
The basis for an answer can be found in the claim that legal
reasoning is a form of moral reasoning. I have argued that moral
reasoning is teleological reasoning concerning means-ends relation-
ships and the desirability of ends. Moral reasoning arises from our
nature as beings who seek to realize the good through action. Our
striving to realize the good arises, in turn, from a deep complex of
needs and desires constituting the human essence. This is not to
claim that one cannot fail to realize the good; obviously one can.
The claim is simply that we share a human essence and that we
intuitively believe that this essence, if realized through appropriate
modes of action, will yield well-being.
If moral reasoning is potentially rational, so is legal reasoning.
The question arises whether moral reasoning is potentially ra-
tional. I have argued that it is. In summary, the argument is as
follows. There is a distinction between well-being (integration)
and its absence. One perceives the distinction through the very act
of living. Within limits, one can also perceive gradations of well-
being and its absence. Through the process of living one becomes
aware that certain modes of activity yield greater integration than
others. This observation leads to the conviction that within oneself
is a human essence-a complex of needs and desires the fulfillment
of which, through certain modes of activity, yields whatever meas-
ure of integration one can hope to achieve. Upon reflection, one
moves to the generalization that the essence within oneself is com-
mon to all persons and that there is a common human essence.
The only available means for testing claims about the nature of
this essence or about appropriate means for realizing it is experi-
ence. That is, the only available method for confirming or discon-
firming an assertion about the human essence is living it out
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experimentally and verifying directly whether a measure of inte-
gration results. Of course, one does not have to experiment per-
sonally with all possible modes of activity. To observe the results
of experiments undertaken by others, either in the present or in the
past, often is sufficient. But even in these cases the ultimate touch-
stone has to be someone's personal experience. Not only do we
have a method for confirming or disconfirming claims about the
human essence, but, within limits, we can communicate with each
other about such claims and about the consequences of living
them out experimentally. And, within limits, we can come to mu-
tual agreement about the measure of integration, or its absence,
resulting from such trials. But if all of this is true, we have an
objective mode of reasoning: that is, we have a mode of inference
in which the standards for evaluating arguments cast in that mode
are sufficiently shared and understood by the participants to allow
for at least the possibility of informed consensus as to the validity
of particular claims and arguments. Hence, moral reasoning is po-
tentially rational. And because legal reasoning is a form of moral
reasoning, legal reasoning is potentially rational as well.
In addition, special characteristics of the legal process make a
consensus of the informed participants somewhat easier to achieve
than is the case in nonlegal moral debate. This is due in part to
the fact that the participants in a legal system often find them-
selves agreeing on a specific objective for purposes of an immediate
issue, and debating the lower-level question of the best means for
achieving that shared objective. For example, if the issue
presented in a case is the proper interpretation of a specific statute,
a panel of judges might well agree upon a certain formulation of
the proper statutory objectives, for the purposes of that case
thereby reducing the level of debate to a choice of that interpreta-
tion that best realizes the shared objective in that context. This
kind of partial consensus is often lacking in nonlegal moral discus-.
sion, where there is a tendency to move quickly to debate about
the deepest foundations of morality itself.
This special feature of legal argument is related to another char-
acteristic. In moral discussion it is sometimes possible for two per-
sons to agree upon a specific objective, and even upon the best
means for pursuing it, without being able to agree upon the deeper
teleological foundations for the shared objective itself. Thus, they
may both agree commonly to pursue objective B by means of A,
but one person may be seeking B because he believes it to be a
means of attaining C, while the other seeks B because he thinks it
19811
49
Pannier: The Nature of the Judicial Process and Judicial Discretion
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1981
WILLIAM MTCHELL LAW REVIEW
to be a means of attaining D, and both may believe that C and D
are incompatible. An alternative way of making this point is by
observing that two or more explanatory practical arguments may
sometimes share a common stem part of the way up from the
choice agreed upon, but differ radically in the upper reaches of the
teleological structure. Whether this kind of divergence will hinder
or prevent cooperation depends in part upon whether the partici-
pants can pursue the shared objective in good conscience, recog-
nizing the possibility of ultimate disagreement over the deeper
foundations of the objective, but believing that under the circum-
stances total consensus is not morally required. The legal process
provides a context in which such limited consensus may be pur-
sued in good faith. This is due in part to the scarcity of time in
which the legal issues may be resolved and in part to our recogni-
tion of the difficulty of reaching agreement on ultimate moral
foundations.
What does the natural law theory of legal reasoning imply with
respect to the question whether legal issues have uniquely correct
solutions? One might suppose that because I have argued for the
ultimate objectivity of moral judgment I am forced to conclude
that there are uniquely correct legal solutions. And, in a sense, a
natural law theorist must believe in uniquely correct answers to
moral questions. But on the other hand, one must remember the
ever-present possibility of human error; as beings seeking moral
knowledge we are fallible. Moral choice is always made under
conditions of obscurity and uncertainty, whether the choice con-
cerns a selection of means for achieving a given end or a selection
of an intrinsically desirable end. Rare are the occasions when one
can say with a justified absolute conviction that one sees the moral
truth about something. It is important to believe in objective
moral truth because that is what we find ourselves continually
working toward. But it is part of a well-founded skepticism about
our own powers of moral insight to be tolerant of disagreement.
This leaves the natural law theorist with a theory of legal rea-
soning that admits, for most legal questions, the possibility of a
range of acceptable solutions. Given the pervasive uncertainty
and unclarity about the nature of intrinsic good and about the
best means of realizing that good in the ambiguous conditions of
history, most legal issues will reasonably admit of a variety of pos-
sible solutions. Of course, there will always be some kind of limita-
tion or outer boundary on the class of permissible solutions. But
that outer boundary will never be marked with bright colors and
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the methods we use to locate it will vary from case to case. Never-
theless, I believe that this conception of legal reasoning captures
the intuitions of the ordinary lawyer to a greater degree than ei-
ther the positivist conception or Dworkin's approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Does a natural law theory help to allay the fears of those unset-
tled by the idea that judges exercise creative moral discretion both
in the formulation and application of legal rules? I think that such
anxieties are rooted in an inadequate conception of the nature of a
legal system, and that when the latter is dissolved, the anxieties
will also disappear. I do not mean to suggest that there is no legiti-
mate place for anxiety about the workings of the legal system, only
that these particular anxieties are misplaced. If a legal system is
understood primarily as an abstract set of rules, perhaps such anxi-
ety is well-founded, because the model is that of an axiom system
for a branch of logic or mathematics, and the rules of such formal-
ized systems do not seem to allow for discretion in interpretation
and application. (Even here, however, Wittgenstein had well-
known doubts.) 1 But if a legal system is seen primarily as a mode
of human activity rather than as a set of abstract rules, a different
conclusion suggests itself. I have argued that a legal system is pri-
marily a teleological human enterprise in which the participants
reason and debate about means-ends relationships and about the
intrinsic desirability of purposes. In placing a citizen in the role of
judge, the social order is not assigning him the task of acting as a
mouthpiece for logically coerced dictates of an abstract axiom sys-
tem. It does not do this because it could not; the intrinsic nature of
action-guiding rules prevents it. Rather, in placing a citizen in the
role ofjudge, the society assigns him both the privilege and respon-
sibility of exercising his best moral judgment concerning means
and ends. Rules exist only as concrete acts of interpretation.
Rules are not the primary legal phenomenon. The basic reality is
the teleological activity of interpretation and formulation engaged
in by those given adjudicative powers. It could not be otherwise.
The better course would be to acknowledge openly the necessity of
creative discretion in the service of moral ends, and to focus con-
cern upon the need for thoughtful allocation of adjudicative power
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and upon the importance of deepening the general level of legal
discussion.
The natural law approach outlined here suggests that judges
also have legislative power. Consider again the case of statutory
interpretation. In enacting a statute, a legislature can set out a
form of language; it must leave the interpretation and application
of the language to courts and to lawyers and ordinary citizens who
must try to interpret the words without recourse to litigation. But
this is implicitly an assignment of the creative powers of a legisla-
tive nature. To the extent that a rule exists only in interpretation
and to the extent that courts are responsible for such interpreta-
tion, courts have legislative powers. And this assignment of legisla-
tive power is one in which all citizens share in the virtue of
participating in a constitutional order that allocates adjudicative
power to courts.
As argued previously, in exercising such legislative powers courts
necessarily use moral reasoning. Here the natural law approach
agrees with Dworkin. In exercising adjudicative power, a court is
enforcing legal rights despite the fact that it is also using moral
reasoning. This is so because the political role in which judges are
placed by the social order requires moral judgment and reasoning.
Exercising moral judgment is what it is to apply the law.
The concept of moral reasoning as defined in natural law theory
differs from that used by Dworkin, however. For Dworkin, moral
reasoning is the drawing of inferences from conventionally shared
moral principles and values; ultimately Dworkin seems committed
to conventionalism as a theory of moral truth. For the natural law
theorist, moral reasoning is inferential reflection about the objec-
tive nature of intrinsic good and about appropriate methods for
realizing such good. Both analyses have as a consequence the
proposition that legal rights are ultimately based upon moral val-
ues. But for Dworkin, those ultimate moral values are whatever
values the society happens to share. For natural law theory, they
are those ends which, in the very nature of things, are intrinsically
desirable.
The natural law theory articulated here also rejects Dworkin's
distinction between institutional and individual morality. It is
true that a moral purpose held by a single individual is different
from one that is shared by a group of persons. But, as argued, any
shared objective or norm is essentially indeterminate, requiring
completion by interpretive acts, and these acts can only be sup-
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plied by individuals, not by the community as a whole. Hence, no
bright line can be drawn between community and personal
morality.
According to Dworkin, the primary feature of a legal system is
its complex of abstract moral principles. His assumption is that a
deontological analysis of practical reasoning is correct. On the
other hand, the natural law analysis attempted here posits the con-
crete activity of teleological reasoning as the primary feature of a
legal system. One of the virtues of a natural law approach is its
ability to account for the assumption that legal arguments can be
ranked in terms of degrees of strength without appealing to the
useless metaphor of weight. For the teleologist it is not principles
that are primary but ends. Therefore, one need not worry about
the hopeless task of assigning "weights" to propositions. One's task
is rather to debate the desirability of ends and the appropriateness
of alternative means to those ends.
The theory advanced here is consistent with Dworkin's theory in
rejecting the positivist's concept of a social rule of recognition, but
for different reasons. Dworkin rejects the theory because he thinks
it cannot allow for the presence within the system of moral princi-
ples whose origin does not lie in judicial decisions or legislative
enactments but rather in a "sense of appropriateness" developing
within the comrhunity over time. On the other hand, a natural
law analysis rejects the theory because it assumes too facile a dis-
tinction between intersubjective verification procedures, which en-
ables the positivist to identify the "law," and the exercise of
judicial discretion. If every interpretive act necessarily involves
moral creativity, then such a distinction cannot be relied on.
Is adjudication as understood here a principled process? Do
courts have discretion in the positivistic sense? If by discretion one
means freedom from binding authority as embodied in datable
political events such as judicial decisions and legislative enact-
ments, then courts do have discretion. But on the other hand, if
legal reasoning is a form of moral reasoning, and if the latter is, in
principle, objective, then courts do not have discretion and are
morally obligated to make principled, that is, morally justifiable,
decisions. Such objectivity does not flow deductively from abstract
principles conventionally developed over time by the community's
"sense of appropriateness," but rather from the fact that there is
an objective order of intrinsic good and the fact that it is, in princi-
ple, possible for a community to grow in knowledge both of the
nature of this good and of appropriate means for realizing it.
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